


# *REAL TIME EVALUATION: RESPONSE TO HURRICANE MATTHEW IN HAITI*

François Grünewald – Groupe URD  
Ed Schenkenberg – HERE Geneva

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2016





## *Disclaimer*

The evaluation team would like to underline the collective nature of the decision to carry out a real-time evaluation of the international response to Hurricane Matthew in Haiti. We would like to thank the Steering Committee, which includes DfID, OFDA/USAID, Canada, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, OCHA, the IFRC, CLIO and the CCO, for their support. We would particularly like to thank DfID for its financial support without which this real-time evaluation would not have been possible.

The authors have endeavoured to relate the situation observed on the ground and the ideas of those interviewed during the mission as accurately as possible. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.

## *The authors*

François Grünewald, Executive Director of Groupe URD

Ed Schenkenberg, Executive Director of HERE – Geneva

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF HAITI	4
LIST OF ACRONYMS	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	9
REPORT	13
1. INTRODUCTION	15
2. CONTEXT	17
2.1. Key contextual factors	18
2.2. Heterogeneity of the impact	18
3. FINDINGS OF THE RTE	21
3.1. Finding 1: Return on investment in disaster preparedness	23
3.2. Finding 2: Rapid mobilisation of international actors	24
3.3. Finding 3: Fragile telecommunication systems	26
3.4. Finding 4: Erratic data management and competing needs assessments	26
3.4.1. AN UNJUSTIFIED LEVEL OF PRECISION	26
3.4.2. THE USE OF OUT-DATED FIGURES	27
3.4.3. COMPETING DATA COLLECTION INITIATIVES	28
3.5. Finding 5: Logistical challenges leading to an uneven response	29
3.5.1. PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS	29
3.5.2. SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	29
3.5.3. TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CONSTRAINTS	30
3.6. Finding 6: Mixed results for the main technical and sectoral areas	31
3.6.1. WASH: A RELATIVE SUCCESS STORY	31
3.6.2. SHELTER: AN UNADDRESSED PRIORITY	32
3.6.3. FOOD SECURITY: DOING THE RIGHT THINGS OR DOING THINGS RIGHT	33
3.6.4. CASH: THE RIGHT MOVE BUT NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS	34
3.6.5. HEALTH: VARYING LEVELS OF SUCCESS	36
3.6.6. PROTECTION	37
3.7. Finding 7: Donor fatigue and depleted financial resources	37
3.8. Finding 8: Patchy coordination	39
3.8.1. VARIED LEADERSHIP OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES	39
3.8.2. WEAK COORDINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	40
3.9. Finding 9: Accountability to affected populations depends on the agencies	42
3.10. Next steps: an integrated approach and a rapid shift required for recovery	43
4. RECOMMENDATIONS	45
4.1. Key recommendations for adjustments to be made to the current response	47
4.2. Key recommendations for the longer term in Haiti	49
4.3. Key recommendations for the humanitarian sector	50
4.4. Key recommendations in the context of the Grand Bargain	51
4.5. Summary of findings and related recommendations	52
ANNEXES	55
ANNEX N°1 Terms of Reference of the Matthew RTE	57
ANNEX N°2 Itinerary and schedule of the RTE	60
ANNEX N°3 Consulted documents	66



# Map of Haiti



# List of acronyms

<b>ACAPS:</b>	Assessment Capacities Project
<b>ACF:</b>	Action contre la Faim
<b>ACTED:</b>	Agence de Coopération Technique pour le Développement
<b>AFD:</b>	Agence française de Développement
<b>CARICOM:</b>	Caribbean Community (Regional Organisation)
<b>CCCM:</b>	Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster
<b>CCO:</b>	Comité de Coordination des ONG
<b>CCRIF:</b>	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
<b>CERF:</b>	Central Emergency Response Fund
<b>CGIS:</b>	Corrugated Galvanized Iron Sheet
<b>CHF:</b>	Swiss Franc (Confédération Helvétique Franc)
<b>CLIO:</b>	Comité de liaison Inter ONG
<b>CNSA:</b>	Coordination nationale pour la Sécurité alimentaire
<b>COUC:</b>	Centre des Opérations d'urgence communal
<b>COUD:</b>	Centre des Opérations d'urgence départemental
<b>COUN:</b>	Centre des Opérations d'urgence national
<b>CRS:</b>	Catholic Relief Services
<b>CWC:</b>	Communicating with Communities
<b>DINEPA:</b>	Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement
<b>DART:</b>	Disaster Assistance Response Team (deployed by OFDA)
<b>DEVCO:</b>	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (EU Commission)
<b>EC:</b>	European Commission
<b>ECHO:</b>	European Commission Humanitarian and Civil Protection Office
<b>EERC:</b>	European Emergency Response Centre
<b>EDF:</b>	European Development Fund
<b>EMER:</b>	Équipe multisectorielle d'évaluation d'urgence
<b>EOC:</b>	Emergency Operation Centre (English name for the COUN)
<b>EERC:</b>	European Commission Emergency Response Centre
<b>ERT:</b>	Emergency response Team (OCHA)
<b>ERU:</b>	Emergency Response Units (Red Cross)
<b>ETC:</b>	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster

<b>DaLA:</b>	Damage and Loss Assessment
<b>DFID:</b>	Department for International Development (U.K. Government)
<b>DHC:</b>	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>DPC:</b>	Direction de la Protection civile
<b>DTM:</b>	Displacement Tracking Matrix
<b>ERU:</b>	Emergency Response Unit
<b>FACT:</b>	Field Assessment Coordination Team (IFRC)
<b>FAO:</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FONDEF:</b>	Fondation de Développement et l'Éducation des Enfants
<b>GB:</b>	Grand Bargain
<b>GHDI:</b>	Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
<b>GSM:</b>	Global System for Mobile Communications
<b>HCT:</b>	Humanitarian Country Team
<b>HEOP:</b>	Head of Emergency Operation programme
<b>HIP:</b>	Humanitarian Implementation Programme (ECHO)
<b>HMMI:</b>	Haiti Mobile Money Initiative
<b>HRC:</b>	Haitian Red Cross
<b>IHL:</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>IDRL:</b>	International Disaster Response Law
<b>IFRC:</b>	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>IOM:</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>LRRD:</b>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
<b>MCDA:</b>	Military and Civil Defence Assets
<b>MDM:</b>	Médecins du Monde
<b>MSF:</b>	Médecins Sans Frontières
<b>MARNDR:</b>	Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources naturelles et du Développement durable
<b>MINUSTAH:</b>	Mission des Nations unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti
<b>MIRA:</b>	Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
<b>MTPTC:</b>	Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications
<b>NFI:</b>	Non-Food Item
<b>NGO:</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NOAA:</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S.)
<b>OCHA:</b>	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
<b>OECD:</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OFDA:</b>	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (part of USAID)

<b>PDNA:</b>	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
<b>PNH:</b>	Police nationale haïtienne
<b>RC/HC:</b>	Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>RTE:</b>	Real Time Evaluation
<b>SIMEX:</b>	Simulation Exercise
<b>TSF:</b>	Telecommunication Sans Frontières
<b>UNDAC:</b>	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
<b>UNDAF:</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNICEF:</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>UNDP:</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>USAID:</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>USD:</b>	United States’ Dollars
<b>WASH:</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WB:</b>	World Bank
<b>WFP:</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO:</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WHS:</b>	World Humanitarian Summit







# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 3 and 4 October 2016, a category 4 hurricane, known as Matthew, struck the Grand'Anse and Sud Departments in southwestern Haiti affecting an estimated 2.1 million people. As the first major disaster since the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held in Istanbul, the international response took place in a particular context: would the response live up to the WHS commitments, especially those laid down in the "Grand Bargain" agreement between major donor governments and agencies? Would there be a noticeable difference in the way donors and agencies set their priorities and framed their strategies and operations because of the 51 Grand Bargain commitments?

Knowing that it takes time for humanitarian reform initiatives to be fully translated into practice on the ground, a small group of donor governments, together with a number of agencies that formed a steering group, took the initiative to commission an independent real-time evaluation (RTE) of the international response to hurricane Matthew using the Grand Bargain as an analytical framework. The RTE was carried out by two independent experts, who visited Haiti in weeks 6 and 7 of the response, i.e. between 13 and 29 November 2016. The Terms of Reference instructed the RTE to look at:

- Whether the international response, as guided by the Flash Appeal and supported by international humanitarian agencies, is proving to be effective, efficient, relevant, and timely.
- How the planning and delivery of the response reflect the commitments listed in the Grand Bargain.

In focusing on these issues, the RTE report presents 9 findings covering:

1. disaster preparedness;
2. the mobilisation of international actors;
3. telecommunication systems;
4. data management and needs assessments;
5. logistics and related challenges;
6. the main technical and sectoral areas;
7. donor responses and financial resources;

8. coordination and leadership;
9. accountability to affected populations.

While providing detailed evidence on these areas, the evaluation's main overall finding is that there has been significant improvement in the international response to the humanitarian consequences of hurricane Matthew compared to earlier disasters in Haiti, even though the improvement has been uneven. Among donors and operational humanitarian agencies, there have been major differences in terms of how they understood the scale and complexity of this disaster. They have responded at different speeds, with different levels of investment from headquarters, and have done well in some sectors, but far less well in others. The efforts made in disaster preparedness and resilience building since the 2010 earthquake have largely paid off, with prepositioned stocks and trained staff facilitating a rapid start to the response, even before communication with the affected area was re-established. National leadership and coordination under the Haitian Civil Protection Agency was rapidly in place, albeit constrained by the absence of a national disaster law. Despite a strong UNDAC presence during the initial phase, it took some time for effective system-wide coordination to be put in place. Finally, OCHA stepped up its role and capacity. At the time of the RTE, there was still no consolidated picture of where the most urgent needs were, or of who had received assistance.

The unevenness of the response has several drawbacks, but the RTE report notes one in particular. With a sectoral approach and some sectors performing better than others, affected communities have received some services, especially in the area of WASH, for example. But as people have urgent food and shelter needs, an integrated, holistic approach that combines several services should be put in place as a matter of priority. Inter-sector, area-based coordination should drive the response, instead of the specific outcomes of individual sectors that largely operate as silos.

As the Grand Bargain is the central reference in this RTE, it is important to summarise the RTE's conclusions in relation to the relevant commitments:

### *More support to local and national responders*

The Haitian authorities have taken the lead in managing and coordinating the response to hurricane Matthew. Few international actors questioned this leadership, which, at first sight, seems to be in line with the Grand Bargain as it emphasises the role of national and local governments. However, as Haiti was in the middle of an election campaign at the time of the hurricane, and is a country where political and financial manoeuvres are commonplace, the need for humanitarian space and principled action is obvious. Though it was right for UN and international agencies to recognise the leadership of the authorities, this did not mean that they had to take a step back from their coordination role. Instead they should be providing guidance and taking initiatives in consultation with the authorities. The RTE observed some good practice in this regard, but also some very poor practice.

### *Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming*

The Grand Bargain attaches great importance to increasing the use of cash and vouchers as this can have a transformational impact on humanitarian assistance in terms of empowering local communities and strengthening markets, thereby increasing economic (and social) recovery. In Haiti, WFP was quick in its effort to assert a leading role in the coordination of cash, but as cash should be used for all relevant sectors, not only for food, intense negotiations resulted in the creation of a workable, OCHA-led cash coordination mechanism. The RTE sees many opportunities for cash in Haiti, provided that cash programming builds on previous experiences and local customs, makes use of existing credit and finance mechanisms, and carefully monitors the impact of cash on markets and people's security.

### *Improved joint and impartial needs assessments*

If there is one thing that could have been better managed and coordinated in the response to hurricane Matthew, it is the collection of data and the coordination of needs assessments and analysis. Early in the response, certain data, especially mortality figures, became a politically charged issue. Different data collection forms and competing needs-assessment initiatives were in place, with the constrained funding environment becoming an exacerbating factor as it inhibits the sharing of data and collective planning. OCHA's initial weaknesses resulted in many shortcomings in terms of data management. In particular, in the area of shelter, the 10 October Flash Appeal, and its November revision, demonstrate a lack of reliable and consolidated data. With the increase in OCHA's capacity and the creation of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator position, data management and systems have improved significantly, but as many of the additional staff are part of surge capacities and stand-by rosters, it will not be easy to maintain the information chain.

### *The participation revolution*

The Grand Bargain stresses the need for affected people and communities to be included in the decision-making that affects their lives and for agencies to share relevant information about their plans and activities with them. The response in Haiti shows that many of the commitments in this area are not yet taken sufficiently seriously. While the RTE saw examples of an agency and some NGOs who had deployed advisors on community engagement, too few agencies make this a priority from the start of their responses. Largely thanks to the actions of one donor who made this a priority, a media organisation has become involved in disseminating information about the activities of the humanitarian community. A coordinator for communication with affected communities was deployed as part of the OCHA surge.



### *Enhance the engagement between humanitarian and development actors*

As in every natural disaster situation, recovery starts from Day 1 of the response. This means that humanitarian and development actors need to work closer together, but their common challenge is to ensure that there is a link between the various humanitarian plans and development strategies. In Haiti, this is a daunting task not only because of the political context, but also because of the plethora of plans and strategies that have been developed. One major additional drawback is that several (major) donors were in the process of leaving Haiti before hurricane Matthew. While their departures have been postponed because of hurricane Matthew, the question

remains about what their potential exit from Haiti will imply in terms of the availability of multi-year humanitarian and recovery funds.

The recommendations presented in the RTE report are organised into four categories:

1. adjustments to be made immediately the ongoing response;
2. measures to strengthen resilience and disaster risk management in Haiti;
3. long-term changes to be made to the humanitarian system;
4. recommendations specifically related to the Grand Bargain.


# REPORT







# 1. INTRODUCTION



This independent real-time evaluation (RTE) has been commissioned by a group of donors in consultation with a number of international agencies and NGO networks who together form the RTE's steering group. The primary goal of a real-time evaluation is learning. It seeks to create a safe space for dialogue and reflection on achievements and constraints. It also contains an accountability element in suggesting course corrections to the response. Conducted in weeks 6 and 7 of the humanitarian response to hurricane Matthew in Haiti, this RTE presents a unique opportunity<sup>1</sup>:

- To understand if the response, as presented in the Flash Appeal and supported by international humanitarian agencies, is proving to be effective, efficient, relevant, and timely.
- To understand if the planning and delivery of the response reflect the commitments listed in the Grand Bargain.

Agreed between a group of major donors and aid agencies at the time of the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Grand Bargain commitments represent both a series of key opportunities for improving the system, and a large number of significant challenges. As the first large-scale rapid-onset disaster since the World Humanitarian Summit (including the Grand Bargain), the international response to hurricane Matthew is particularly important to evaluate in this regard, and the RTE team was therefore asked to use the Grand Bargain commitments as a main analytical framework.

Following a number of pre-mission briefings and interviews with donor and agency representatives who were in Haiti in the early days of the response to hurricane Matthew, the RTE team spent one week in two field locations (Sud and Grand'Anse departments), and one week in Port au Prince<sup>2</sup>.

As part of its methodology the team developed a timeline to understand the preparedness and response efforts of the respective actors. The team also looked into actual operations and delivery, information management, resource mobilization, coordination and partnerships, as well as the perspectives for recovery and rehabilitation. Before leaving Haiti, the RTE team shared a seven-page document containing preliminary findings with immediate stakeholders, and held some feedback sessions with them.

Following a chapter placing the response to hurricane Matthew within the political and environmental context in Haiti, the main body of the report presents nine main findings, including themes such as preparedness, accountability to the affected population, logistical challenges, programme content, and coordination. The findings are assessed against some of the main Grand Bargain commitments. The final chapter outlines a number of recommendations in the following categories: (1) adjustments to be made immediately to the ongoing response; (2) measures to strengthen resilience and disaster risk management in Haiti; (3) long-term changes to be made to the humanitarian system; and (4) recommendations specifically related to the Grand Bargain.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Annex 1 for the Terms of Reference (ToR).

<sup>2</sup> See Annex 2 for the itinerary and meeting schedule.



The background image shows a complex metal framework, likely part of a bridge or a large industrial gate. The structure is made of grey-painted steel beams and girders, connected by numerous bolts. It appears to be in a state of disrepair or collapse, with some sections sagging and debris on the ground. The setting is outdoors, with trees and foliage visible in the background. A large, solid green triangle is positioned in the upper right quadrant of the image, serving as a design element for the title.

## 2. CONTEXT

## 2.1. Key contextual factors

Haiti is located on the path of seasonal hurricanes in the Caribbean, and is prone to extreme weather. Nonetheless, hurricane Matthew, which struck on 4 October 2016, was a category 4 hurricane, and one of the strongest to take place in the last decade. Due to man-made environmental causes, such as deforestation, hurricanes have a particularly devastating impact, causing floods and mudslides. In recent years, Haiti has also been faced with multi-annual drought, food insecurity (caused by drought and previous hurricanes which have wiped out crops), and outbreaks of cholera.

In addition to these environmental factors, Haiti has seen years, if not decades, of extremely poor governance and political turmoil. The UN peacekeeping force MINUSTAH has been in the country since 2004, and it has arguably prevented the country from further political collapse and supported electoral processes. However, it has also been a source of tension as its prolonged presence is not fully understood, and it has been accused of bringing cholera into the country.

The 2010 earthquake in Haiti saw core structures of the government seriously affected, including human resources. Moreover, the government was side-lined, overwhelmed, and overridden by international actors who had huge amounts of funding to deliver assistance thanks to highly successful fundraising campaigns. Everything that happens in the humanitarian domain in Haiti is still heavily influenced by these experiences, and the response to hurricane Matthew is no exception. The hurricane also hit just days before presidential and parliamentary elections, which consequently were postponed for six weeks. While the government did appeal for international assistance in the days after the event, it unfortunately did not declare a national disaster, reportedly for political or economic reasons.

## 2.2. Heterogeneity of impact


Hurricane Matthew made landfall near Les Anglais (Southwest Haiti) on 4 October at 11h00 UTC, with maximum sustained winds of 230 km/h. The cyclone and its cyclone surge impacted a large coastal band covering the extremity of the 'Grand Sud' Peninsula, i.e. the departments of Sud and Grand'Anse, and then crossed Haiti, with a decreasing impact from the Sud to the North.

The winds had a devastating impact on human settlements and vegetation, with large variations depending on location, elevation, and orientation. Coastal areas were also significantly affected by a strong, yet slow, cyclone surge up to 1.5 meters high.

While the southwest peninsula ('Grand Sud') – a mainly agricultural zone interspersed with some towns – was particularly affected, Gonâve Island, Artibonite, Nippes, and the northwest (in particular the low northwest) were also hit. These were already amongst the poorest areas in the country, and had been badly affected by years of drought. The few NGOs working in these departments are calling for them not to be overlooked in the response, particularly as they were affected by heavy floods a few days after the passage of hurricane Matthew.



## Map of the most affected regions following Hurricane Matthew







A photograph of a coastal area with damaged buildings and debris, overlaid with a yellow triangle containing the text '3. FINDINGS OF THE RTE'. The scene shows a small, partially destroyed building with a corrugated metal roof and light blue walls. The ground is covered in mud, debris, and a young banana plant in the foreground. In the background, there are more damaged structures and a body of water under a blue sky with some clouds.

# 3. FINDINGS OF THE RTE





**Forested area where trees have been massively affected**

### 3.1. Finding 1: Return on investment in disaster preparedness

Disaster risk management has been part of the aid landscape in Haiti for several years and the RTE team saw a number of effective preparedness measures, including alerts, the pre-positioning of stock, training, and contingency plans bearing fruit.

Due to 'Cry Wolf' syndrome, many Haitians initially did not take the evacuation announcements very seriously or were reluctant to evacuate, but overall, the evacuation went better than during similar events in the past. The alert was triggered when the hurricane started its formation and was identified by satellite images, a few days prior to its landing on Haiti. Initial uncertainty about the trajectory of the hurricane created some early confusion, but when it became clear that Haiti would be hit, evacuation messages were sent to the population through various means, including megaphones. The National Emergency Operation Centre (Centre des Opérations d'Urgence National – COUN) was activated on Saturday, 1 October. Instructions were also provided to the Departmental and Communal Emergency Centres known by their French acronyms, COUD and COUC, as well as to municipalities and local Red Cross volunteers. Evacuations were facilitated by the early identification of possible temporary shelters.

Mayors and the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) were instructed to buy food and basic items from local shops in order to have some reserves, including water, in the shelters. Thanks to ongoing interventions (such as the DFID-funded Resilience programme, and the WASH/Health cholera response), partners working in Matthew-affected areas like UNICEF, MDM and ACTED, CARE and FAO pre-positioned staff, resources, and relief items (tarpaulins, water tablets, small equipment for road clearing, etc.) prior to the passage of the hurricane. As of October 1, USAID/OFDA had pre-positioned non-food emergency relief supplies (NFIs) for a total of 8,000 households (40,000 individuals) in Artibonite, Jacmel, Jeremie, Les Cayes, and Port-au-Prince through the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Additionally, before the hurricane hit, USAID/OFDA partners IOM and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) had been provided approximately \$200,000 in rapid response funding to support immediate logistics, shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and other preparedness and response activities approved for Hurricane Matthew. In terms of food assistance, WFP was able to pre-position food stocks in Matthew-affected areas thanks to funding from Canada. This all made it possible to rapidly kick-start the response the day after Matthew reached Haiti.

The DPC and its COUN, has played a central role in terms of the training and mobilisation of national actors. In June and August, the DPC undertook two simulation exercises (SIMEX), one of which included a hurricane and involved the Departments that are currently affected by hurricane Matthew (Sud, Grand'Anse, and Ouest)<sup>3</sup>. In addition, several NGOs and UN agencies have supported the COUD and COUC in the 'Grand Sud' in recent years.

Many COUN and COUD staff have received support from international actors, in particular USAID/OFDA and UNDP (through an ECHO-funded project). The investments in the Haitian resilience agenda made by donors such as ECHO and DFID, Switzerland, Canada, and the World Bank have also contributed to a better level of disaster preparedness. This is particularly evident when compared to the contexts of the 2004 and 2008 hurricanes, and the 2010 earthquake. In 2016 USAID/OFDA<sup>4</sup> supported IOM with \$700,000 to pre-position emergency relief supplies in Haiti, for use by international organisations and local response partners like the DPC and Haiti Red Cross.

#### **Grand Bargain Commitment: More support for national and local responders**

Following years of investment in strengthening the capacities of the national, departmental and communal civil protection mechanisms (COUN, COUD, and COUC), and with all the lessons learnt from the difficulties and frustrations encountered after the 2010 earthquake, progress, especially at the national level, has been made. There is room, however, to further strengthen the capacities of COUDs and COUCs.

<sup>3</sup> In May, there was a Seismic/Tsunami SIMEX in the northern part of the country.

<sup>4</sup> Haiti Program Summary, USAID'S Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) fiscal year (FY) 2016.

Prior to hurricane Matthew, IOM had thus pre-positioned relief commodities (hygiene kits, plastic sheeting, and water containers) in its central warehouse in Port-au-Prince and in facilities in Artibonite, Grand'Anse, Sud, and Sud-Est departments. Similarly, UNICEF has been supporting the Emergency Department of the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA) since the 2010 earthquake, and earlier in 2016 it had helped DINEPA to dispatch emergency supplies in each department. UNICEF noted, however, that these supplies were very limited in view of the scale of the recent disaster, suggesting that the amounts of funding provided by donors for preparedness measures in a disaster-prone country like Haiti were still inadequate. Nonetheless, the RTE team feels that these preparedness investments have been important in terms of developing trust between national and international institutions in a context where the scars left by the 2010 earthquake, and the way the international community dealt with national institutions, are still felt.

### *3.2. Finding 2: Rapid mobilisation of international actors*

The early meteorological forecasts for hurricane Matthew meant that there was a significant level of activity and mobilisation of emergency response capacities in Haiti and the region by international actors, including donors, military, UN agencies, and international NGOs.

First of all, several donor governments present in Port-au-Prince set up crisis cells in their embassies and deployed disaster response teams. The US, for example, activated a regional Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) on 3 October and moved staff to the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Haiti. A Washington D.C.-based Response Management Team was activated to coordinate the regional humanitarian response. DART deployments combine the role of a donor, coordinator, and implementer, and at its peak, the Haiti DART team was made up of more than 50 staff, including locally recruited Haitian nationals and US expatriates. At the time of the RTE, DART staff were still based in Grand'Anse (Jeremie) and Sud (Les Cayes), as well as in Port-au-Prince. A Canadian Disaster Assessment Team (CDAT), which arrived just after the hurricane, concluded that the Canadian government should make more financial resources available rather than send more people. At the request of the Haitian government, the EU, in turn, deployed a team from the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism as part of its European Emergency Response Capacity, as well as ECHO Regional experts.

In addition to this, a number of countries in the region or with a presence in the area, including the US, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, France, and the Netherlands (the latter two under the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism) sent military and civil defence assets. Their helicopters and boats turned out to be a key factor in transporting responders and relief goods to the affected areas. Other assets that they brought included drinking water installations and medical supplies.

In terms of the UN's rapid response, a number of agencies pre-positioned stocks and deployed staff in Haiti or in the region. Central to the UN's early response was the deployment of the UNDAC team, which was co-located in the DPC premises in Port-au-Prince. As there was uncertainty about the exact trajectory of the hurricane, some members of this team were initially deployed in other parts of the Caribbean, which meant that they had to be redeployed to Haiti after the hurricane had hit. The UNDAC team was comprised of OCHA staff, UNDAC-accredited nationals from UN member states, and staff from ACAPs and MapAction (funded under separate arrangements with international donors). UNDAC staff members, together with the authorities, members of the diplomatic corps, international donors, and implementing agencies, started to fly over the affected areas as soon as the weather conditions permitted to establish the degree of the impact of the hurricane, and make the first rough needs assessments (from the air). However, there was also some confusion.



The UNDAC team could not deploy an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) and the Reception and Dispatch Centre (RDC) at the airport put in place only operated for 24 hours, after which it was closed at the request of the authorities. Lastly, a number of international NGOs also pre-positioned stocks, either in Port-au-Prince or the region, and some also deployed field teams in the at-risk areas a few days before the disaster.

Many of the staff hired prior to the hurricane were either Haitians, or international staff with good knowledge of the Haitian context. Though the emergency teams deployed after the event were highly competent in rapid response and some of them had prior experience in Haiti as part of the earthquake response, their lack of knowledge of Haiti's specific socio-cultural features was in a few cases an issue. To mitigate this potential problem, teams like USAID's made great effort to pair international staff with local staff to overcome this potential issue.

Social science is rarely a core competence requested from rapid emergency teams and as these teams are mostly around for a short period of time, institutional memory is often not sufficiently built.

### Grand Bargain Commitment: More support for national and local responders

The level to which UN and international agencies made a special effort because of their Grand Bargain commitment to recruit national and local NGOs as implementing partners in the response is not clear. WFP, for example, works with FONDEF (*Fondation de Développement et l'Éducation des Enfants*), a relatively large local organisation in Sud, but this seems to be driven by pragmatism, to get the job done, more than anything else. Other agencies referred to the flexibility and agile way of working of some local NGOs, but one of them noted the need for these local NGOs to be certified before it would be able to contract them as partners. Interestingly, the question of who is a local NGO is also relevant to Haiti. CARE, for example, has been in the country for more than 54 years and is registered as a local organisation, even though it is managed by international staff.

An example of good practice in terms of working with national and local actors was the fact that the Haitian Red Cross played a central role in the relief effort thanks to the support of the IFRC and partner National Societies.

### Timeline of the response



### 3.3. Finding 3: Fragile telecommunication systems

As can be predicted in the case of a hurricane, and as identified already during the July 2016 SIMEX in the north of Haiti, telecommunications, in particular the GSM networks, were the soft spot in the response chain. As soon as Hurricane Matthew hit the Southwestern peninsula, communications between Port-au-Prince and most of the affected areas were cut, as more than 70 telephone antennae were down. Even the MINUSTAH bases in the areas were impacted. In spite of the efforts of the private telecoms provider DIGICEL to try to re-establish the GSM networks as soon as possible, many zones remained incommunicado for periods of between 3 and 10 days. Many actors in the affected areas had to find alternative solutions. In several places, communal and departmental authorities were only able to use the few satellite phones owned by the MINUSTAH, NGOs, or UN or other agencies. In the days following the hurricane, these, and other satellite phones that were brought in, became the pivotal means of communication for the overall response to the hurricane. In Jeremie, the only means of communication for several days were satellite phones provided by TSF (Télécoms sans Frontières) and the Haitian Scouts to the COUD, who immediately deployed experts to the field in support of the DPC. For the UN, the Emergency Telecommunications cluster mobilised part of its (global) stand-by capacity to establish proper means of communication for the COUDs, UN offices, and some NGOs.

In view of the critical nature of telecommunications for a successful response, it is noteworthy that several wishes for more robust and resilient telecommunication systems were reported to the RTE team. Observing this weakness, the RTE team feels that other, more sustainable (and less costly) means of communication could be considered in anticipation of future events.

### 3.4. Finding 4: Erratic data management and competing needs assessments

The collection and consolidation of data for the hurricane Matthew response was erratic. In terms of the content of needs assessments, their credibility was frequently impacted by the lack of quality in the data used, both in terms of its level of precision and continued relevance. Coordination was also lacking, both with regard to needs assessments and data collection processes.

#### 3.4.1. An unjustified level of precision

In many documents pertaining to hurricane Matthew the RTE team noticed a desire for precision which not only lacked substance but which was counter-productive to developing a quick and effective set of working hypotheses. During the first days of a disaster response, it is common that the aid system is only able to present working hypotheses on which to base decisions. Flash Appeals and similar documents are only credible to the extent that they clearly clarify this point, and explain the basis upon which the hypotheses have been formulated. The RTE team found a number of reports and publications published a few days after the hurricane landfall that cite highly precise numbers of affected people, or which refer to other indicators in unrealistically specific terms<sup>5</sup>. One agency situation report, for example, noted that “2,128,708 people have been affected” while “approximately 86 schools are used as temporary shelters”.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Some of the figures in the documents pertaining to Hurricane Matthew were developed on the basis of secondary data, such as (contested or outdated) demographic figures from years before the hurricane, or collected through rough aerial assessments done by helicopter in the days after the hurricane.

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF, Haiti Situation Report, 1 November 2016.



Such figures do not add credibility, but by wrongly giving the impression that hard data is sufficiently available, they can, on the contrary, be counter-productive to realising a high quality response. The tension between the desire for precision, and the need to develop a quick and effective set of working hypotheses could have been eased by using satellite images, or drones and tools such as OpenStreetMaps, but the RTE team noted that these opportunities were not sufficiently explored.

### 3.4.2. *The use of out-dated figures*

Though the post-hurricane situation evolved rapidly, the RTE team found evidence of agencies that were still using planning figures compiled in the early days of the response. In rapidly changing situations, data captured day *n* may not be meaningful anymore when published day *n*+*x*. Weeks into the response, at the time of the RTE, data collection was still mostly a catch-up exercise, as many of the systems, methodologies, and processes for data collection, analysis, and sharing had just been established. The RTE team could not find any consolidated picture for the areas that had been most affected, and where people had still received little or no assistance. However, it should be noted that further processes and mechanisms for data collection were put in place during the second part of November, in particular in the food security sector. The aim was to progressively collect more precise data that would fill the knowledge and information gap in order to improve the last part of the pure relief distribution period, and to prepare the recovery phase. The lack of coordinated or joint needs assessments. Generally speaking, the RTE team found that needs-assessments and data-sharing processes lacked coordination. This was due to a number of factors. First of all, agencies were at different stages in terms of mounting their operations, and therefore some were quicker than others in starting their needs assessments. In particular, some of the NGOs that already had a presence in the affected areas through their development programmes, preferred not to wait with their assessments until the relevant coordinating bodies (i.e. the relevant line ministry with the co-sector lead) were ready to coordinate them.

Secondly, while not unique to this hurricane response, agencies have different interests or areas of focus when it comes to doing needs assessments. Those with a mandate or expertise in a specific sector will do a needs assessment in that sector, whereas others may have a broader or wider scope in terms of overall needs. In the case of Haiti, this – combined with the different speeds at which agencies operated – created a situation in which data about some sectors was relatively available, while data in other sectors remained very incomplete. The RTE team noted, for example, that the data presented in the Flash Appeal on shelter needs seemed to fall well below the real needs<sup>7</sup>.

#### **Grand Bargain Commitment: Improve joint and impartial needs assessments**

The Grand Bargain builds on and expands years of multiple efforts and initiatives to improve data collection and needs analysis in order to inform agencies' and donors' priority-setting and decision-making. Looking at the response to hurricane Matthew, needs analysis and data-sharing was not in keeping with the principles of the Grand Bargain. The RTE team did, however, find a few 'mitigating' factors given the circumstances. The Haiti OCHA office's capacity had been neglected. This, combined with a Government that asserted its central role while in election mode, clearly had an impact on the effectiveness of data collection and information management processes. The RTE team also feels that those organisations that were quick off the mark could not wait until others were ready before carrying out their needs assessments, but they should have kept others, including the authorities, informed about these efforts. The actions of the DHC in relation to the revised Flash Appeal are informative: he circulated the critical needs overview with a number of Port-au-Prince actors, informing the Government of his actions.

The RTE team also feels that there is a need for caution in relation to donors' expectations for a joint (and single) overall needs assessment. In several interviews, organisations underlined the fact that there are necessarily different levels of detail in their different assessments: the inter-agency assessment is more global, while the agency (or sector) specific level has a more fine-tuned focus. The issue is, therefore, not to argue for a single joint inter-agency assessment, but for a better articulation of the relation between the two levels, which should mutually reinforce each other.

<sup>7</sup> See section 3.6.2

The RTE team also found that the issue of joint or coordinated needs assessments was negatively impacted by the fact that different types of assessments can serve different purposes, for different types of actors. While donors may want to quickly have an overview of the situation and the needs, and therefore call for 'joint assessments', NGOs may prefer a number of 'coordinated' needs assessments that together aim to understand the areas where they will work. This local level of assessment becomes extremely useful at the more global scale if there is a process of sharing and collating information. However, in an environment such as Haiti, where limited funding becomes a constraint relatively quickly, needs assessment data becomes a valuable tool for fundraising, and organisations may become reluctant to share it.

### 3.4.3. *Competing data collection initiatives*

The RTE team also found that there was a lack of coordination of data collection, with competing initiatives running in parallel.

NGOs deployed in Haiti as part of the *Équipe Multisectorielle d'Évaluation Rapide* (EMER) undertook needs assessments while ACAPs and MapAction – who had joined the UNDAC team – were also actively collecting data. The NGOs that were part of the EMER initiative used an electronic questionnaire on mobile devices, including Haitian-made tablets. While this questionnaire had been discussed at the central level, it had not been validated by the DPC who felt that, once again, aid agencies were bypassing Haitian authorities. The questionnaire available with the DPC at the COUD and COUC levels was used by a number of agencies, but not by all. Standard assessments, such as the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) were not carried out, even though the MIRA form had been approved (and, in the end, not used) in 2014.

Neither the data gathered, compiled, and reported by these different initiatives, nor the maps prepared by MapAction got formally published, as the government did not authorise them. In particular, data about the number of people killed by the hurricane became hugely sensitive. As it became impossible to make this data quickly and formally available through the usual channels, such as [humanitarianresponse.info](http://humanitarianresponse.info) (Haiti), information was shared through some alternative channels. Neither the HC, nor the UNDAC team, co-located with the DPC at the COUN, were unable to unlock this situation. In this environment, confusion, misunderstandings, and tensions on data management dominated the initial weeks of the response.

This issue, with a government in the lead being reluctant to recognise and/or make needs analysis data public, is one that is not unique to this response. In addressing such tensions, the RTE team noted good practice in the context of the revised Flash Appeal, when the DHC followed a two-pronged approach. He shared the revised data not only with the government, but also with a selective group of Port-au-Prince-based international actors, and informed the government that he had done so. This practice appropriately combined two principles: the leadership of the Haitian government and the need to uphold the humanitarian imperative to respond fast.

The fact that information was patchy led to a lack of understanding of the real situation on the ground. In this context, the RTE team was concerned about the IOM's promotion of its displacement tracking matrix (DTM) as an information management tool that provides data about people who have become displaced. The RTE team is convinced that such a tracker, developed for protracted displacement settings, makes little sense in the context of hurricane Matthew. It detracts attention from the real issue, which is to develop a consolidated picture of who has received what and where, in order to understand the operational gaps as a matter of urgency.

## 3.5. Finding 5: Logistical challenges leading to an uneven response

Humanitarian operations in Haiti are logistically challenging due to the country's under-developed infrastructure. The speed and character of the response to hurricane Matthew was very uneven, and weak logistics were a major factor behind this. At the time of the RTE team visit, several areas had still not been properly assisted. Physical, security, transport and storage constraints all contributed to this situation.

### 3.5.1. Physical constraints

Few areas were prepared for road clearance or had the equipment (e.g. shovels, pics, saws, wheelbarrows, etc.) in stock at the local CDC or with the municipal authorities. In addition, heavy road clearing equipment was not pre-positioned, leaving the removal of major obstacles (including landslides) to manual labour.

The 'Grand Sud' is a central mountainous chain, with steep slopes, surrounded by a complicated coastal band. Even in normal times, its physical features are logistically challenging. A number of areas are only accessible by sea, and road development is a work in progress; the road between the towns of Les Cayes and Jeremie is not yet completed. The RTE team was told of affected communities and municipalities who cleared roads with limited resources, removing fallen trees and other rubble produced by flash floods, the hurricane surge and landslides. Local public work companies are underequipped, and without the MINUSTAH's involvement and the work done by the Dominican Public Works company, many areas would have remained *incomunicado* for much longer. As one interviewee said, it would not have been too complicated to develop arrangements with private companies (for example, the local subsidiary of Caterpillar) as part of the preparedness measures. In this regard, the mobilisation of the fire brigade to remove rubble from Jeremie quickly to allow aid vehicles to circulate was mentioned to the RTE team as an exemplary local effort.

### 3.5.2. Security constraints

In the sectors dependent on heavy transport facilities, such as food and shelter, insecurity was the primary obstacle for delivering supplies. Significant parts of the Haitian population live in poor conditions, and organised illicit activities and corruption are commonplace. The RTE team noted a downward spiral: with aid deliveries taking more time, Haitian communities have become more impatient, which has further increased insecurity, which, in turn, has further delayed the deliveries.

WFP recognises that a number of the truck drivers it initially contracted were not necessarily reliable. The RTE team heard of several stories of trucks that had broken down and which turned out to be working again after a crowd had emptied them. Many interviewees pointed to the urgent need to improve communications with affected communities. When people in (dire) need see helicopters fly over regularly, but do not receive any assistance for weeks in a row, understandably, they become impatient. An increased engagement with communities on behalf of aid agencies would arguably lead to more acceptance and mitigate tensions.

A number of security mitigating measures were taken, albeit late in the process. The Haitian national police (PNH) and MINUSTAH have become actively engaged in securing food convoys and other deliveries. The negotiations with these security providers, however, proved to be complex and sometimes lengthy. While MINUSTAH's escorts are free for NGOs, they are generally seen as inflexible, and the procedure for obtaining them too cumbersome. Some agencies also felt that since much of MINUSTAH's resources were allocated to support the elections, they were unable to be sufficiently present and flexible to respond to the security needs of humanitarian agencies. For a number of organisations, PNH escorts are the preferred option. However, the PNH is notorious for its use of force, its escorts cost money, and, like the MINUSTAH, it has perception and acceptance issues.




Some humanitarian agencies do not use armed escorts as a matter of principle. Noting their concerns about the operation's over-reliance on security escorts, OCHA has been active in providing guidance on military escorts. At the time of the RTE, OCHA staff were taking further steps to try to reduce the involvement of MINUSTAH and PNH in the distributions.

### 3.5.3. *Transport and storage constraints*

While several smaller quantities of food, shelter supplies, and NFIs were distributed relatively soon in the response, there was a lull in the delivery when the initial supplies were depleted, and there were insufficient means of transport and storage facilities in the field to establish new stocks of supplies in the affected areas.

The storage capacities available in Les Cayes and Jeremie were limited, severely hampering the establishment of the logistics chain. As WFP and other agencies did not have offices or warehouses in these areas, everything had to be put in place from scratch. There was also no terrestrial strategy to reach the most remote areas, as frequently exists in other countries with mountains. WFP and several other agencies have tried to cope with access problems by diversifying the means of transport to include road, aerial, and naval means.

Road transport is often seen as the preferable and cheaper option. Vehicles mobilised for the response ranged from small, local 'tap-taps' (minibuses and pick-ups run by local organisations) to commercial trucks and 17 off-road trucks which are positioned in Les Cayes and Jeremie to support WFP and interagency distributions in the affected areas. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the only means of access was by air however.



Aircraft and helicopters came from MINUSTAH and the US (which brought in 18 helicopters in different waves – 12 were in permanence in Haiti), while the French Embassy, WFP, and NGOs such as MSF, Oxfam, and Samaritan's Purse were able to hire aircraft and helicopters.

Government representatives, members of the diplomatic corps, UNDAC, and other humanitarian staff all either wanted to see the extent of the damage or needed to travel to the affected areas. The question of how to strike the right balance between the use of aerial means for VIP visits or to transport badly needed relief items was raised in several interviews. During the first weeks, most flights were for aerial assessments, staff transport and, to a lesser extent, for moving supplies from stocks in Port-au-Prince to warehouses in Les Cayes and Jeremie. In two weeks, the U.S. military helicopters managed to deliver more than 275 metric tons (MT). By comparison, the WFP helicopters that took over after the U.S. military helicopters left had only transported 118 MT<sup>8</sup> by 20 November. Yet, as much of the commodities were delivered to Les Cayes and Jeremie in

<sup>8</sup> See the table, extracted from Logistic Cluster Overview, 20/11/2016

the first week which ultimately opened up to road transport, there was a perception that the relief operation did no longer require air support. More remote locations were more difficult to get to, requiring Landing Zone reconnaissance and had far less offloading capacity at sites. In that context, declining requests for US military airlift support were a factor in the decision to withdraw this assistance. The two heavy-duty US army helicopters proved extremely useful, and the RTE team found that they were taken out of service too quickly. The small helicopters rented by WFP after the withdrawal of the army helicopters could only transport very small loads, and were thus of limited effectiveness and efficiency. Yet they were still not fully utilized due to limited requests in the following weeks.

As Haiti is an island and the impact of Matthew mainly affected the southwestern peninsula, naval transportation in support of the relief effort rapidly became a key factor. The Netherlands and Colombia sent useful navy ships, and initial operations were coordinated by the Logistics Working Group. On one occasion, the Dutch ship had to turn back to sea in a hurry, causing damage to the jetty, when a huge crowd gathered on the shore in Jeremie, creating a security threat. Still, the RTE team found that these ships were underused, and the initial assets withdrawn too quickly, as it became necessary to mobilise small barges and other boats to reach affected coastal communities. WFP, in particular, started to explore maritime options from day 1 after the event and has been actively developing naval transportation in an effort to both supply hard-to-reach locations and to increase capacity to deliver goods to the main harbours. The table above shows the relative importance of maritime means within the overall logistical set up.

Another issue raised during the RTE was the delivery mechanisms on the end user side. While distributions in urban settings can be tense, the recipients rarely have any difficulty getting their relief items home. The situation is very different in rural contexts, especially when people have to come from far away in the mountains. The difficulties encountered in carrying relief items home, in particular food rations, was regularly brought to the attention of the RTE team. WFP did not prepare smaller rations, which could have been delivered more quickly and to a higher number of households. Helicopters continued to deliver 50kg rice rations which are not easy to transport in the Haitian Mornes, and which do not allow a large number of families to be covered. 15–20kg bags would have been much easier to carry back home, but it seems that the resources to re-condition the bags were simply not available.

### *3.6. Finding 6: Mixed results for the main technical and sectoral areas*

The quality of the response to hurricane Matthew was uneven: while there were examples of good practice in some technical and sectoral areas, there was more limited success in others.

#### *3.6.1. WASH: a relative success story*

Compared to several other sectors, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) sector was performing relatively well. This is due to several factors. Firstly, WASH had been given high priority already before hurricane Matthew, because of regular outbreaks of cholera and diarrhoea. This meant that many WASH activities were already ongoing, with staff and capacities deployed in the area. Secondly, DINEPA – the government authority in this sector – has significant capacity, is seen as effective, and has a number of well-established partnerships with agencies, such as UNICEF, and NGOs, such as OXFAM, ACTED, CARE, and Solidarités International. Together with its partners, DINEPA had pre-positioned some WASH equipment in the affected areas, such as bladders, pumps, purification tablets, etc. Thirdly, the WASH sector was quick off the mark in its response. The first day after the hurricane, trucks were loaded with equipment and as soon as the road over Petit Goave bridge opened 48 hours later, they were sent to the affected areas. Units for drinking water were put in place, water purification tablets<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> There was a need to control the distribution of Aquatabs as it was perceived by those without WASH expertise as a panacea. UNICEF therefore supported DINEPA to write a note on the context of use of Aquatabs.

were distributed in as many places as possible, and the distribution of hygiene kits was rapidly prioritised. The afore-mentioned pre-existing partnerships and contingency agreements with UNICEF and NGOs allowed the work to start as of 5 October. It is also interesting to note that many of the clean water units were temporarily installed as they were too costly and complicated to maintain. DINEPA, the local Water Board and the agencies have thus looked



for longer-term solutions, and have started to install new systems, or to rehabilitate some of the water systems that were in place prior to the hurricane.

While these aspects make for a rather positive WASH picture, the RTE team also felt that further efforts need to be made to ensure community engagement, especially around hygiene practices. The large hygiene campaigns that were launched in the context of the cholera response, and the promotion of “open defecation free communes” mean that communities may have understood what they need to do in terms of hygiene standards, but this is not often put into practice.

### *3.6.2. Shelter: an unaddressed priority*

Unlike WASH, the shelter sector has largely failed to respond to the urgent shelter needs that many people (still) have. This has been due to lack of good data and failing logistics, but also to slow government decision-making processes, and inefficient management of the shelter pipeline.

The most visible manifestation of the impact of hurricane Matthew is the destruction of housing. Many people have lost their homes. Damage was done not only to roofs, but also to the main structure of houses. With the continuation of the rain, and the cold climate of the mountainous areas, the lack of shelter may even result in hypothermia and increase mortality rates amongst the elderly, children, and pregnant women. While the 10 October Flash Appeal notes that in the worst affected areas it is estimated that 90% of the houses have been destroyed, shelter is hardly prioritised by the appeal. It only allocates 10% of the budget to this sector, after food security and WASH. The revised appeal (known as the Critical Needs Overview), released in mid-November, notes that more than 500,000 people have unmet shelter needs but does not provide further (consolidated) data on the number of houses destroyed or more precise figures about people in need of shelter. Apparently, the actual number of people in need of shelter is extremely difficult to gauge because of the lack of pre-disaster data, and, at the time of the RTE, the extent of the shelter needs was still very unclear.

The RTE team also saw a number of locations in Grand d’Anse and Sud that had not yet received anything in terms of emergency shelter. The initial shelter response should have consisted of an immediate blanket distribution of tarpaulins, but this failed for a number of reasons, including insecurity and logistics issues. Indeed, as with food and NFIs, shelter distributions are particularly dependent on transport and storage facilities, and as discussed above, the security of warehouses and vehicles quickly became a problem as convoys were looted.

Another factor in the failure to provide shelter materials efficiently was slow decision-making by the government. The RTE team was told of the unclear and lengthy process for deciding whether to use tarpaulins or corrugated iron sheets (CGIs). The Haitian authorities initially decided to limit the distribution of tarpaulins. With the experiences of the 2010 earthquake in



mind, they wanted to avoid the image of their country covered in plastic sheeting. While corrugated iron sheets (CGIs) is the preferred shelter option in terms of sustainable roofing, the quality of CGIs available on the market in Haiti reportedly falls below internationally accepted quality standards.

IOM was responsible for managing the NFI and shelter pipeline, and they worked actively in collaboration with the DPC, which also had to approve the requests. The RTE team found a number of contradictory statements in relation to the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of the pipeline. IOM maintains that it looked at new requests for shelter materials based on previous distributions (to avoid duplication), and prioritised affected areas based on reported needs. Through regional coordinators, IOM worked with partners to identify and intervene in these areas. For a number of reasons, this was not a perfect process. A number of requests were vague or incomplete, or the entity making the request did not have a field presence to carry out the distribution. Moreover, there was a concentration of partners (and distribution requests) in urban areas. This meant that there was not only a lack of information on affected populations in areas where few agencies were present or active, but also pressure from counterparts to release materials to collective centres rather than to communities in areas of origin.

It should also be recalled, however, that the initial weeks of the response coincided with an election campaign during which a number of local government representatives worked to divert the assistance for their benefit. Carrying out basic needs assessments in order to plan distributions of tarpaulins and NFIs seemed to be the reasonable way to ensure some level of accountability and tracking of the assistance. IOM made it clear that it could not grant new requests for supplies, if partners did not report on earlier distributions. At the same time, however, interviews with shelter partners revealed much dissatisfaction with IOM's management of the shelter supplies pipeline. Many of their multiple requests for supplies of tarpaulins remained unanswered. Effective partnerships depend on pipelines and stocks being handled in a transparent manner. The RTE team was told of IOM managed warehouses in Port-au-Prince that still contained large quantities of unused tarpaulins (reportedly up to plastic sheeting for 300,000 people).

The leadership and capacity of the line ministry in charge of the shelter sector coordination – the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications (MTPTC) – is reportedly said to be relatively weak in comparison to other sectors. In addition to this, it is unclear to what level IOM has scaled-up its coordination capacity in the shelter sector. The RTE team came across at least one NGO, specialising in shelter, who had given up on the shelter working group in one of the affected areas and who perceived IOM's input in this group as ineffective. It is also telling that instead of IOM working as co-lead of the shelter working group in one of the field locations, this role had been taken over by another actor.

In addressing these issues, much depends on the shelter working group coordinator who arrived as part of the standby roster of one major donor mid-November. Her major task is to get the sector fully active as it is seriously falling behind in relation to what it should have delivered in the first few weeks after the hurricane.

### *3.6.3. Food security: doing the right things or doing things right*

While some examples of good practice were noted with regard to food security, as with shelter, there were problems in coping with the increase in needs. Indeed, 6 to 7 weeks after the event, significant parts of the highly-affected areas had still not been reached. As noted above, this can largely be attributed to the logistical and security constraints, but also to insufficient implementation capacity on the ground, with a number of NGOs leaving relatively quickly after the hurricane, and a limited variety of food items in the pipeline.

Food security was severely hit, as hurricane Matthew damaged existing food stocks, killed livestock, and destroyed fishing boats. The economy of the 'Grand Sud' is highly dependent on agriculture, and the devastating impact of the hurricane was felt even more due to the significant drawbacks that the region has endured in its agricultural production for the last decade and a half. Haitian coffee production collapsed due to the decrease in the price of coffee on global markets in the late 1990s, while, its replacement crops, beans and cassava, have been significantly affected in recent years as a result of the El-Niño induced drought.

In the context of hurricane Matthew, the RTE found that the availability of food was not immediately an issue, as in the first few days after the hurricane people resorted to eating dead animals and fallen bananas, thus allowing them to survive. However, as the days passed, and food distributions were slow in taking off, the lack of available food started to be more strongly felt in several areas, in particular in the colder, and less accessible mountainous chain in the middle of the southwestern peninsula.

While the initial concentration of efforts on the main urban centres is understandable given the risk of social tensions if people remain without assistance, it is worrying to note that there have been reports and/or rumours about cases of malnutrition in rural areas. The alarm was raised about malnutrition by mobile clinics, and several actors, including UNICEF, started to mobilise high energy products such as Plumpy'nut (which is now produced in Haiti). The risk of malnutrition should not be under-estimated, but it is important to bear in mind that hypothermia and/or diarrhoea may be major factors, as much as the absence of food. In light of this, it is noteworthy that rather than a 'food only' focus, agencies have rightly taken a broader and more holistic approach when looking at people's needs, in line with the Nutrition policy developed by the Ministry of Public Health and international partners.

The issue of food security in the hurricane Matthew response raises the dilemma of doing the right thing(s) or doing things right. Doing the right thing would mean ensuring fast access to some kind of food. Doing things right would have meant distributing only the comprehensive balanced food ration. In tropical rural areas, where food rations would in any case be temporary and where wild food and leaves would provide part of the micronutrient ration, distributing an unbalanced food aid ration quickly to as many families as possible is better than distributing a balanced ration later.

### *3.6.4. Cash: the right move but not without problems*

Rapidly discussions about cash took over from the debate about food distribution practices. While it is not completely problem-free, the ongoing progressive transition from in-kind aid to cash appears to be the right move in all the relevant sectors in the Matthew response.

In some areas, NGOs such as CRS have already undertaken market assessments, and assessments regarding food, shelter (mainly CGI), and non-food items generally found that market-based responses were feasible. As many hypotheses argued for cash as a workable response tool<sup>10</sup>, the Flash Appeal contained a significant cash component. The most notable is the WFP/CARE project, which

#### **Grand Bargain Commitment: Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming**

Shifting classical in kind distribution to cash transfer is seen as one of the most important commitments of the WHS and the Grand Bargain. Much time and energy has gone into leading the coordination of cash in Haiti. With the working methods that have been developed, there is a need now to turn attention to the progressive transition from in-kind aid delivery to cash. This should be feasible in all relevant sectors, provided that market conditions are conducive and links are made with existing financial institutions and money transfer systems.

---

<sup>10</sup> Note on Cash standards for the Matthew Response, OCHA

aims to reach 800,000 people with food and cash distributions, but cash assistance was also planned in the early recovery, shelter, and WASH sectors. Seven weeks on from the hurricane, the OCHA Cash coordinator indicated that some 28 partners were implementing around 160 cash activities in food security, shelter, livelihoods and early recovery, and WASH.

In order for cash-based responses to work, local markets need to be able to provide sufficient quantities of quality items. While the difficult supply situation and the destruction of market stocks induced significant price increases and reduced availability in some areas, the RTE found that urban markets recovered quickly, and that beneficiaries preferred receiving cash to in-kind assistance. In a number of affected remote areas, markets were often badly hit, and only slowly resumed their activities four to six weeks after the disaster. Inevitably, markets in the most affected mountainous or remote coastal areas, which were functioning in a haphazard way even before the hurricane, will be slower in picking up their daily routines<sup>11</sup>.

Secondly, the existence of properly functioning mechanisms for cash transfer needs to be taken into account when shifting to cash as the preferred aid modality. Haiti has experience with three viable cash transfer systems: local micro-finance institutions, banking systems used to deliver Diaspora remittances, and mobile phone systems such as the Haiti Mobile Money Initiative (HMMI). The development of the latter system matches well with the progress made by the Hifive programme. This programme, which works to strengthen the capacity of farmers to use mobile banking, can provide an important boost to the agricultural sector. In addition, the RTE team also sees the need to integrate cash distributions with the local, small-scale credit and saving systems. This, and other economic activities, such as charcoal production and storage, and other modalities that have been used in Haiti even for a large scale response such as the 2016 drought, could serve as a way for people to create capital and absorb and re-distribute quantities of cash.

The shift to cash is not without problems however. The RTE team became aware of several key issues, which have attracted much attention and debate:

- Should cash be provided with or without conditions?
- Should cash be linked to specific sectors or should it be inter-sectoral by definition?
- What would be the most appropriate method depending on the area: in kind, voucher, direct cash, or a cash transfer through different types of channels?
- What would be the best coordination mechanisms: the Food Security Working Group or a specific new mechanism?

The most problematic issue in terms of integrating cash into the response, however, has been the perceived competition between OCHA and WFP. Views have differed on who should lead the coordination of cash in Haiti, and how the role of national institutions can be made prominent. Reportedly, WFP was quick in sending five cash programme managers to the country, in an effort to boost its programmes. The agency has extensive experience and capacities in different types of cash-based programmes, including vouchers, cash cards, and mobile cash transfers, and is able to inject resources into an economy affected by a crisis. It rapidly took the lead in the discussions about 'multi-sectoral cash', which made several agencies and some donors rather uncomfortable. With the WHS and Grand Bargain commitments on cash in mind, it is clear that there is much at stake in terms of the development of cash coordination, and the Haiti experience may inform future debates about aid architecture. The arrival of a cash coordinator sent by OCHA is facilitating dialogue



<sup>11</sup> WFP and the Government have also undertaken large market assessments. The Government (MARNDP) monitors large markets in the area on monthly basis. CRS with USAID carried out a shelter market assessment.



between all the parties concerned. This process will (hopefully) lead to the appropriate 'resource transfer tool box' being identified. This will allow the fast and fair recapitalisation of affected populations, giving them access to the basic means of survival and restoring their dignity.

### 3.6.5. *Health: varying levels of success*

While there is no question that the evacuations and preparedness measures put in place significantly reduced the direct number of deaths and casualties, hurricane Matthew's indirect impact was amplified given the dismal state of shelter, and cholera centres largely below accepted regulations and procedures in terms of hygiene, sanitation, and waste treatment.

It is important to bear in mind that the already weak health system in the 'Grand Sud', had been even further weakened prior to the hurricane by several months of strikes by medical staff working in public health facilities. Hurricane Matthew had both a direct and an indirect impact on the state of public health in the affected areas. First of all, there was the direct death toll, as people were killed due to collapsing houses, falling trees or flying objects such as pieces of iron sheets, wood, etc<sup>12</sup>.

While major limitations existed in evacuating wounded people in the days after the hurricane, the preparedness measures discussed in section 3.1 undoubtedly helped to reduce casualties. Haitian Red Cross Volunteers and teams prepositioned along the coast by NGOs like ACTED were able to deliver first aid in the first hours. Though there must have infected wounds, there appear to have been no reported cases of tetanus, despite the relatively low rate of vaccinations.

In terms of the indirect impact of hurricane Matthew on health, the RTE team received reports from health staff about a rise in acute respiratory diseases due to exposure to wet and cold climatic conditions, given the dismal state of shelter. This has particularly affected children and elderly people. Hurricane Matthew has also had a severe impact on already limited health infrastructure, especially for mother and child healthcare, as it destroyed several facilities. During the response, a number of health actors have focused primarily on mobile clinics. Fewer of them are looking at the reconstruction of the health system. Some are trying a combination of both, with the mobile clinics supporting existing, but weak local health services.

While a significant cholera vaccination campaign was launched in late October, cholera was



present in the affected areas prior to the hurricane, although on a relatively limited scale<sup>13</sup>. This has led to NGOs and some donors (including ECHO) to question the effectiveness of the vaccine (especially the one dose injection), and the level of mobilisation of resources needed to implement it at the expense of other health activities. There has also been concern that the vaccination could compromise the impact of hygiene measures. In the aftermath of the hurricane, the deteriorated access to clean water has been an immediate concern, especially as a peak has been observed in acute diarrhoea. Although many of these

cases may not be cholera, there has been a sufficiently high number of adult deaths to be cause for alarm. This has led to a surge in medical programmes in order to increase the treatment capacity and strengthen preventive measures alongside existing cholera programmes. At the same time, many NGOs have faced difficulties in scaling-up their capacity.

---

<sup>12</sup> Some international press reports put the death toll at nearly 1000, in comparison to the government figure of 546.

<sup>13</sup> Larger cholera outbreaks were registered in Dame Marie in 2016.

### 3.6.6. Protection

In every humanitarian response, protection has both a strategic character that should underpin all operations and a practical character in the sense of a set of operational activities. The level of importance of both aspects depends, of course, on the context. In the response to hurricane Matthew, the RTE team noted that protection had not been given a prominent place in the operations, for two reasons. Firstly, very few actors present on the ground have a protection background, and those who do, had worked mainly on child protection or on gender-based violence before the hurricane. Secondly, the context and challenges that came with the hurricane did not immediately present obvious protection concerns. This, however, changed significantly as time went by. At the time of the RTE, forced evictions from evacuation centres (public schools, etc.) had become a reality due to the authorities' desire to rapidly close the shelters. Staged student protests led by activists sought to empty the schools still occupied by many vulnerable people who had lost their homes. In Les Cayes, for example, in mid-November, the OCHA Head of sub-office had to spend most of her time trying to avert further forced evictions by negotiating with the authorities. Her interventions, combined with the presence of a protection officer deployed by the Global Protection Cluster brought welcome additional protection capacity, but, overall, too few protection actors were on the ground. As a result, the gathering and analysis of protection data have been relatively weak and have not sufficiently featured in the overall strategy and activities of agencies.

### 3.7. Finding 7: Donor fatigue and depleted financial resources

While a small group of donors have demonstrated an interest in providing funds to the multi-lateral hurricane response, many donor governments are reluctant to invest further in Haiti's future. This is due to the instability of the country, but also to the surplus of crises that causes major shortfalls in humanitarian funding globally.

Haiti is a complex country for many donors. As one donor representative noted, "we cannot do development in this country". Instability, corruption, and a highly uncertain political situation are all reasons for this. At the time of the hurricane, many donors had frozen at least parts of their long-term funding. But even short-term humanitarian funds in response to the hurricane have not been provided at the levels requested. The 10 October Flash Appeal followed an announcement made on 7 October by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which released a grant of 5 million USD to address lifesaving needs. Another 8 million USD was allocated to UNICEF for the cholera response. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched an Emergency Appeal for 6.8 million CHF (\$6.9 million) to help the Haitian Red Cross Society assist 50,000 people in the southwest of Haiti. Both appeals were revised in November, with the UN appeal now amounting to 139 million USD and the IFRC to more than 28 million USD. At the time of the RTE, 46% of the Flash Appeal funds have been raised, which is a common figure as donors often take the position that UN Appeals are inflated. Unfortunately, in the case of hurricane Matthew, the opposite is true. Needs at the time of the Flash Appeal were still largely uncovered. As such, this 46% became a problem.

While the factors that impede long-term (and development) funding may also play a role in the reluctance of donors to fund the response to hurricane Matthew, there are two specific constraints that appear to have a significant impact on the lack of humanitarian funding.

#### **Grand Bargain Commitment: Increase collaborative, humanitarian, multi-year planning and funding**

There was a limited donor response to hurricane Matthew due to donor fatigue and the Haitian political situation. As such, donors are not 'walking the talk' on this commitment. Too few donors have prioritised Haiti in their funding decisions. The 2016 HRP was largely underfunded and the (revised) Flash Appeal is only showing a marginally better situation. For 2017 (and beyond), the 'sixty four thousand dollar question' is whether the (predictable) lack of humanitarian funding will be compensated by recovery and developments funds. Usually, these funds (when they are forthcoming) do not have an immediate impact on the humanitarian needs in the country as they are directed at strengthening systems rather than responding to needs on the ground.

Firstly, hurricane Matthew comes at a time when the eye of the world is turned towards countries such as Iraq and Syria. In spite of agreements such as the Grand Bargain, the world is faced with major shortfalls in humanitarian funding, not least because of the surplus of crises. Several donors noted that their funds at the end of this year have been depleted, with Haiti falling off their list of priorities. The hopes expressed at the time of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing that there would be significantly more resources for humanitarian aid, also with arrival of new donors, have vanished.

Secondly, the insurance mechanism (CCRIF) of the Caribbean community regional organisation (Caricom) announced on 7 October 2016 that it would pay out 20.4 million USD to the Government of Haiti, due by 19 October, and 3 million USD later on. Donors

**Grand Bargain Commitment: Greater transparency on funding**

The limited response from government donors to humanitarian needs arising from hurricane Matthew resulted in a competitive environment in which agencies and NGOs did not necessarily share information, as they were keen to maintain their privileged bi-lateral relations with donors. A number of key informants told the RTE team of flag planting practices, in which agencies and NGOs claim a certain sector or geographical activity in anticipation of donor funding. As these funds did not come forward, the 3W overviews (who is doing what and where) quickly provided a skewed picture as they still included the organisations' names while there were no activities on the ground. Another consequence of the competitive funding environment is that, as seen in other crises, agencies are keen to report on their activities in terms of what they have done without giving sufficient credit to the international or local NGOs that did or are doing the job for them. Information on available funding is available on OCHA's Financial Tracking Service website. As there is a need for humanitarians to be aware of development funding (and vice versa), the RTE team would see value in the use of the IATI platform, but notes that few donors and agencies seem to be using this platform.

have been told where some of the millions of this pay-out went, but it remains a mystery with regard to the majority of the money<sup>14</sup>. This, coupled with the fact that the Haitian Government did not declare a state of emergency can only be seen as a hindrance to international resource mobilisation. Indeed, with such opaque developments, it is easy to imagine why donors remain reluctant to step up to the plate.

In terms of donor reporting, several weeks into the response to Matthew, at a time when most organisations were deeply involved in operations, ECHO sent an audit mission to review previous programmes. Understandably, this created a strong resentment on behalf of ECHO's partners. In a sense, it also appeared to go against Grand Bargain commitments to simplify and reduce reporting requirements. The Brussels-based planning schedule for audits should not have followed in this case.

On the upside, many of the small group of donors that have demonstrated an interest in providing funds to the multi-lateral hurricane response have actively engaged with each other in an informal humanitarian donor coordination group. While several of the humanitarian donors were slowly disengaging from Haiti, the arrival of hurricane Matthew has been a useful opportunity for key donors to continue working together: USAID, DFID and ECHO, joined in the context of Haiti by Switzerland and Canada. This group has been meeting regularly, exchanging information about their resource mobilisation, funding decisions, and priority sectors. One of these donors also described their extensive efforts to raise interest in this crisis amongst other donor governments.

By mid-October, these donors had also sent a letter to Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Steven O'Brien, to express their concern that the response would need to reflect the commitments of the Grand Bargain in order for this agreement to have relevance and credibility. Furthermore, they took the initiative for this RTE, which many interviewees have welcomed as a helpful exercise. Indeed, many of them expressed hope that this RTE would help to promote the Grand Bargain commitments, which is the responsibility of both the donors and operational agencies.

<sup>14</sup> <http://caricom.org/communications/view/ccrif-ready-to-pay-haiti-a-little-over-us20-million-following-passage-of-hurricane-matthew>



## 3.8. Finding 8: Patchy coordination

If there is one area where the shadow of the 2010 earthquake response has had an influence, it is coordination. Early on in the response, the Haitian Government, in particular the Minister of the Interior and the Head of the DPC, made it clear that the Government would lead the response. Clearly, this message was taken on board by the international humanitarian community, and the cluster system was not activated. This resulted in an uneven coordination system which depended on the capacity and will of the different line ministries and local authorities.

### 3.8.1. Varied leadership of national and local authorities

The COUN has been recognised as the main coordination body. It hosts the HCT and inter-sectoral coordination meetings, and was the rear base for the UNDAC team. Meetings were so well attended by the aid community that, anecdotally, the HC, who co-chaired the HCT meetings with the DPC Head, once had to speak from the doorway as the room was packed.

Yet, due to the absence of a formal legal framework, the DPC's overall leadership role has not been without controversy. Despite major investment on the part of the IFRC several years ago in raising awareness in Haiti and the region about the value of international disaster response law (IDRL), Haiti does not have a national disaster law. As a result, the DPC does not have a legal basis, nor a line in the national budget, and largely functions on the basis of support from international actors (such as USAID/OFDA and UNDP). The Ministry of Interior and the President's Office play significant roles in controlling the authority and work of the DPC.

Each of the respective line Ministries (or government departments) serves as the Chair of the relevant sector. For example: the Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate (DINEPA) is in charge of WASH; the *Coordination Nationale pour la Sécurité Alimentaire* (CNSA) is in charge of food security; the Ministry of Public Health and Population is in charge of health coordination, etc. The effectiveness of these sector working groups is heavily dependent on the capacities of the ministries in charge, which are variable. The coordination of the food security sector, for example, is relatively complex as the capacities of the MARNDR at the national level and its departmental offices are relatively weak, despite a lot of good will.

The announcement by the Government that it would lead sectoral working groups implied that the plan to activate the clusters became a non-starter. Reportedly, even the organisation of the first meeting of the Logistics Working Group, which happened in the Karibé Hotel rather than on the COUN premises, led to some tensions. The RTE mission met with very few representatives who were willing to question the non-activation of the clusters. One dissenting voice noted that their non-activation could have had a disincentive effect on the international humanitarian community. The context of the decision is particularly significant: it came during a period of presidential and parliamentary elections, with government entities probably more concerned about their future, than about allocating sufficient energy for coordination.

The coordination process at the department and local levels has been a mixed bag of experiences as well. Departmental and communal civil protection units were rapidly mobilised to coordinate the response with the COUD and COUC, in particular where NGOs have been active in supporting COUD and COUC capacities in the past. Mayors have also played significant roles, both with positive and less positive outcomes. Some have bought stocks out of their own pockets as part of the preparation phase. Others, however, have reportedly been selling the tarpaulins supplied to them. The decentralisation of authority and power has been a sensitive issue in Haiti for many years. With more authority delegated to the municipalities, the role of municipal teams in information exchange and identification of (humanitarian) priorities has become more prominent.

Yet, in too many places, agencies bypassed the municipal level and went straight to the sub-communal and community administrative levels. This was regularly mentioned, and is badly perceived as municipal actors were left alone to manage the early days after hurricane Matthew's passage. They had to take a lot of initiatives on their own and, consequently, feel that they were marginalised by the aid system.

### **3.8.2. *Weak coordination of the international system***

While OCHA eventually strengthened its activities, the coordination of the international system was initially very weak, contributing to the generally patchy picture of the international response. As a result, aid organisations, especially NGOs or other non-UN agencies, such as members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, rapidly lost interest and stopped taking part, or focused their coordination efforts on their institutional networks. As a result, international coordination became a catch-up exercise, even after improved capacity and tools were put in place.

There are different reasons for the initially weak coordination. Most importantly, OCHA's Haiti office had visibly very little capacity. Before the hurricane hit, OCHA had three members of staff and the office was scheduled to be closed some time in 2017. OCHA's capacity to coordinate the response was further weakened following the decision on the part of the Head of Office to go on holiday at a time when there was an imminent risk that hurricane Matthew would hit Haiti. Additionally, the Head of the regional OCHA office in Panama decided not to travel to Haiti until three weeks after the hurricane. Although the UNDAC team included several team members with an OCHA background, clearly it could not compensate for such structural weaknesses. Several actors told the RTE team that they did not understand the exact role of the UNDAC team. Much of UNDAC's daily activity was taken up by liaising and coordinating with the Haitian Government on behalf of the international system. In the first days following the passage of the hurricane, the team provided daily briefings to the COUN on the findings of the assessment missions while also feeding this information to other Government stakeholders and the Humanitarian Country Team. The consequences of OCHA's limited coordination capacity manifested themselves in various ways: initially weak information products; meetings that focused mostly just on information-sharing; and a lack of meaningful coordination mechanisms in terms of priority-setting and decision-making. Against this background, the release of the Flash Appeal on 10 October can be seen as an achievement, even though it lacks the necessary prioritisation and includes some activities that should not have been part of the response in the first place (such as the DTM – see further below).

Following concerns raised by some donors and other humanitarian actors, OCHA strengthened its response. It declared the hurricane in Haiti a corporate emergency on 18 October for three months, and began to make a number of serious adjustments. Firstly, it increased its staffing with specialists on information management and cash coordination and sent a number of staff members as part of its emergency response team. Secondly, thanks to these reinforcements, within a short timeframe OCHA upgraded some basic information management tools in support of coordination, such as contacts lists and meeting schedules. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it deployed a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) at the request of the HC, who acknowledged that he did not have experience in managing a humanitarian emergency. The DHC deployment was widely seen as making a major difference to the response: existing coordination mechanisms were restructured; a core humanitarian country team was put in place (made up of operational humanitarian organisations exclusively); and OCHA's work in support of sectoral and inter-sectoral coordination was further scaled up.

Another factor that hampered effective coordination was the fact that UN agencies did not approach the idea of governmental lead in the same way. Some of the UN or other international agencies thus understood their coordination responsibilities very differently. The RTE team noted significant differences in the internal ratings of the level of this disaster. These ranged from corporate emergency (e.g. OCHA), to Level 2 (e.g. UNICEF), Level 1 (e.g. WFP) to no level at all (e.g. IOM). As a result, agencies also took different steps in mobilising their coordination capacities. When asked what the non-activation of the clusters meant for them, one of the UN agencies noted that this did not make any difference. Their coordination work still includes facilitating the sector working group, developing strategies and sharing information, and ensuring that there is a link between the different sectors and the inter-sector coordination. Other agencies appear to have understood that, as there was a governmental lead, they could take a back seat in relation to their coordination responsibilities. The Camp Coordination and Management cluster, for instance, has never been discontinued as there are still IDPs in Port-au-Prince, and over the years it has developed good relations with a national institution, the *Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics*. Nevertheless, the RTE team finds its relevance for the Matthew situation questionable. The additional staff capacity they sent was deployed to support the agency's operational role, not as coordination staff, which would have been to the benefit of the sector working group.

With a government in election mode, the politicisation of the aid effort should have been proactively considered as more than a serious risk, not only at the country level but also by OCHA's senior leaders. Some of the UN agencies noted that their active engagement with government and coordination efforts were also intended to mitigate against this risk. In their view, co-leadership does not mean fewer coordination responsibilities, but different ones, such as securing humanitarian space by guiding the relevant authorities in the right direction. Perhaps it is telling that few interviewees spontaneously referred to the value and importance of humanitarian principles.

With OCHA having stepped up its role and capacity, it is clear that the initially weak picture of the state of coordination improved considerably by early November. OCHA provided the RTE with a long list of its achievements since mid-October. This is all good news and should be recognised, but there are two potential risks. The objective of coordination is to support operations, it is not an objective in itself. One of the downsides of the clusters has been that agencies seek space and protect their respective cluster/sector even though the context may not necessarily require this structure. In the response to hurricane Matthew, CCCM would be one such example, with IOM, which had led this cluster in the earthquake response, insisting on its relevance for this response. Meanwhile, with additional sub-groups emerging on issues such as cash and communication with affected communities, there is a risk that a coordination architecture will be built which is not sustainable, especially as many of the experts who have been flown in will have left the country by the end of 2016.

Furthermore, coordination is most effective as close as possible to the field. Port-au-Prince is generally seen as a bubble in relation to the rest of the country. Even the town of Les Cayes (in Sud) comes across as being very detached from the western part of Sud, which has been much more affected by the hurricane than the city. With this in mind, and in order to avoid the risk of creating coordination bubbles, those in leading coordination positions should not only travel to the field and affected areas regularly, but also should consider being based there. Consideration should also be given to holding meetings in locations close to the affected areas, perhaps on a rotation basis. This should not require any major infrastructure in terms of new offices.

Other than the government-led coordination and sectoral working groups, NGOs also have their coordination mechanisms: CLIO, which essentially has a development mandate and existed prior to the 2010 earthquake; and CCO, which is mainly for international humanitarian NGOs, and was created after the earthquake. These two networks quickly engaged with their members when the hurricane hit. On the government side, the main interlocutor for NGOs is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. While this office has been supportive and receptive to the role of NGOs, it has also become more assertive within its reinforced department for NGO coordination.



The two NGO coordination platforms have been very active in lobbying donors for resource mobilisation, including, for example, through their counterparts based in Europe. It is interesting to note that these two platforms, which basically ignored each other at the time of the 2010 earthquake, are now planning to merge.

### 3.9. Finding 9: Accountability to affected populations depends on the agencies

Good intentions and actual practice in humanitarian action do not always correspond. Although accountability to crisis-affected populations has been a policy priority for many agencies for many years, the RTE saw a mixed picture when it comes to engaging with affected communities in the delivery of aid in the hurricane Matthew response.

First of all, there are some differences in terms of how agencies understand and approach the concept: some refer to it as communicating with (affected) communities (CWC), which largely

#### **Grand Bargain Commitment: Include people receiving aid in making decisions that affect their lives**

Integrated and holistic responses to their needs is what people want and should expect from humanitarian agencies. With a few exceptions of some agencies delivering such approaches involving shelter, NFI, food and WASH (e.g. IFRC in Grand'Anse), affected people see a system which functions as a one-size fits all machine and does not consult them about what they need. The cluster system has contributed to specialisation and (some level of) accountability, but its downside, a stove-piped machinery, is one that is visible in situations such as Haiti where the clusters are not even activated. In addressing this, the RTE team sees a clear need for better, tailor-made area-based multi-sectoral coordination which integrates the various sectors at the base, instead of at the top.

means sharing information on when and where people will receive aid, and what they will receive. Even if only intended in this sense, information-sharing is still in need of significant improvement in Haiti. Large segments of the affected population have simply not received any information about the response at all. This, in turn, leads to significant tensions between the population and aid organisations, which then contributes to security incidents. By the time the RTE arrived in Haiti, Internews, an organisation working with local radio stations, was implementing a major programme to restore radio communication and assist national and local government in broadcasting vital information to affected communities.

Other agencies go a step further as they stress the need for engagement to be a two-way process, in line with the concept of accountability. Agencies should

make adjustments to their programmes depending on the feedback they receive. The RTE team found several examples of agencies and NGOs that had sent advisors on accountability to affected populations in the first weeks of the response. But this seems to be more the exception than the rule. For some NGOs, accountability to affected populations comes naturally. Several of them had development programmes in the affected areas prior to the hurricane. As a result, they have well-developed local networks with communities, local leaders, such as mayors, and other relevant local actors. For them the two-way communication with communities is not an add-on to their programmes, but an integral part of their way of working. This also suggests that for community engagement to be effective, it should be built on local traditional solidarity-based systems, such as the 'konbit', in which people feel a strong sense of commitment to working together.

Clearly, better community engagement was a key factor for improving security for aid convoys and distributions, and, even more importantly, for better protection for affected communities. At the time of the RTE, the forced evictions of people who sought refuge in schools became a major issue. In towns such as Les Cayes and Jeremie, student protests, often incited by political activists, demanded the emptying of schools for them to be able to resume their classes again. Such demonstrations and evictions are, of course, unacceptable, but they are also the result of the absence of an effective returns strategy and insufficient supplies for people to rebuild their houses.

Lastly, but not less importantly, one key moment for communicating with communities is when they register with the Mayor or local DPC office in the context of their evacuation to shelters. This presents an opportunity for the broad dissemination of key-messages, a practice that was partly in place in the area before the hurricane, but should have been more widely in use.

It is surprising that communication with the population was not immediately seen as a 'mission-critical cross-cutting issue despite the lessons learnt from the 2010 earthquake. Mobilising agencies around the issue in week 6 is quite late, although many NGOs and structures like INTERNEWS were already very engaged in this area. Moreover, while the RTE team recognises the need to establish a common and coordinated approach to communication and community engagement, it is also convinced that organisations just need to get on with it. There is a serious risk in this area that joint strategy development and a common approach will lead to lengthy processes and the establishment of a coordination industry. Getting the information out and engaging with affected communities is really not that complicated. More than a technical or coordination problem, it should be an ethical dimension of humanitarian aid. The RTE team regrets that this is still far from being the norm.

### *3.10. Next steps: an integrated approach and a rapid shift required for recovery*

With the uneven response and patchy picture of services and goods delivered, humanitarian actors need to reflect on their next steps given the time that has gone by. The emergency phase is largely over, which is not to say that there are no emergency relief needs, but efforts should have been directed towards recovery and rehabilitation much earlier. While most agencies realise that this rapid shift to rehabilitation is needed, they are unsure how this can be done when even basic survival relief is still not in place in large areas.

In the response to hurricane Matthew, the RTE team has observed a humanitarian system that is (still) largely supply-driven and, most of all, that has become used to a stove-piped approach. The result is that the various sectors and services are out of sync with each other. Organisations working in the WASH sector, for example, have done a great job in installing drinking water facilities and rehabilitating toilets, while people still need to be protected by a roof or shelter. What is therefore urgently needed, especially for people who have not received anything, is a multi-sectoral, holistic, integrated response based on an area-based approach, instead of a sector-driven response.

In looking for good practices that follow a similar line, the RTE team wishes to note the integrated responses of several agencies, including, for example, the IFRC in the most Western tip of Grand D'Anse, that deliver a response consisting of shelter, NFI, food and WASH, which will be complemented with cash and support to livelihoods, in the area where they work. This integrated response is particularly important to address the plight of the people remaining in evacuation centres such as schools, as they should receive multiple services at the same time in order to enable



them to return to their original homes as quickly as possible. With people having sought refuge in communal buildings, a (maximum) 15–20 minutes-walk from their homes, the aftermath of hurricane Matthew is not a displacement crisis. Protection strategies should also promote this safe and dignified return and put in place mechanisms monitoring gender-based violence or child-protection at the community level.

Meanwhile, in reality, in many areas, in particular where no emergency aid has arrived, people have moved rapidly to the recovery mode, reconstructing their houses with whatever they could find in the vicinity. Others rapidly planted cassava. In many places, people have started to produce charcoal as a source of revenue and to ensure both basic and recovery needs. With the seasonal rains ending in late November/early December, the window for the planting season was extremely short after the hurricane. As FAO was able to re-allocate some stocks of seeds and tools five weeks after the event, the agency made an effort to make these supplies available for the immediate planting season, and to procure fishing equipment. The next steps will include efforts to find (good quality) seeds and other planting material for the next main planting season in March, as well as fishing equipment for the coastal populations. If these are not available in Haiti, there are concerns in terms of the delays that the importation and approval process may cause.

In terms of recovery and rehabilitation plans at the national level, the RTE team heard of the Damage, Loss and needs Assessment mission (DaLA) sent by the World Bank and the Ministry of Finances, and the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) led by UNDP in close collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. These plans were developed in parallel, relatively soon after the hurricane, but with little coordination with each other. In addition, with these processes mainly undertaken at the capital level with the Ministries, some questions remain as to how they link with humanitarian planning documents, such as the Critical Needs Overview and, especially, the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017. The common tension between such humanitarian and development processes is frequently the missing link between what people need (i.e. the concern of humanitarians) and what the government wants (i.e. the driver for development frameworks). Especially in a politically-charged context like Haiti, this tension is no small issue. In addition to this, the RTE team was struck by how unfamiliar partner organisations seem to be with the concept of early recovery.

The RTE team does not underestimate the task of linking these various plans and processes for those in charge. The HC/RC in particular has his work cut out to ensure that different agencies' plans are compatible; the (revised) Flash Appeal; the Humanitarian Needs Overview and 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan; the PDNA, UNDAF, DaLA, (etc.), not to mention donors' plans and bilateral work with the Haitian Government.

The RTE team views the efforts of several donors to coordinate emergency and development funds with measured optimism. Perhaps driven by the limitation in resources, the European Commission, for example, is aiming to make the concept of linking relief and development (LRRD) operational. This will entail improved interaction between its different departments and using the European Development Fund (EDF) as a catalyst for recovery and transition to development. Similarly, the French Development Agency (AFD) has re-allocated some of its development funds to support the recovery of the health and agricultural sectors. Canada is also mobilising resources for the recovery of the agricultural sector. Such efforts will hopefully contribute to a better transition to the recovery and development phases.



# 4. RECOMMENDATIONS





**Cholera treatment center**



A great deal of progress has been observed in the response to hurricane Matthew, and many of the recommendations made after the tragic 2010 earthquake are now partly shaping the response. It is in this constructive spirit that the following recommendations have been drawn up. They are organised into four categories: (1) adjustments to be made immediately to the ongoing response; (2) measures to strengthen resilience and disaster risk management in Haiti; (3) long-term changes to be made to the humanitarian system; and (4) recommendations specifically related to the Grand Bargain. It should be noted that some recommendations fit into more than one category.

#### 4.1. Key recommendations for adjustments to be made to the current response

##### *Rec N°1: Develop a consolidated overview of areas not yet reached by aid*

As a matter of priority, **all agencies, with the support of the DPC and OCHA**, should collectively consolidate information to develop a picture of the areas that have not received any assistance since the hurricane. In particular, this overview should include hard to reach areas, which can be mapped using a mix of approaches including remote sensing, satellite imagery, and drone generated assessments together with all information already gathered by NGOs (and, more broadly, civil society) on the ground.

##### *Rec N°2: Accelerate the process of supporting food security*

The mobilisation of resources and implementation of programmes covering food security and the reestablishment of livelihoods should be a priority for **donors, specialised UN agencies and NGOs** for the coming weeks in order not to miss the last opportunity during the current rainy season and to be ready for the next cycle. **This should be coordinated with the CNSA.**

##### *Rec N°3: Ensure that displacement in evacuation centres does not become prolonged and accelerate the delivery of proper assistance and protection for those who return.*

Instead of spending more resources on the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), priority should be given to fast and appropriate solutions that could facilitate people's return to their areas of origin and their houses. Orderly voluntary return will also reduce protection risks linked to eviction.

##### *Rec N°4: Continue efforts to overcome the bottlenecks in the delivery of aid*

Despite the efforts of the Logistics Cluster, there is a need to augment and diversify transport means and access points. Furthermore, it is essential **that agencies managing relief stocks and pipelines** share information on stocks and supplies of shelter materials and NFIs, and are transparent with regard to the workflow in relation to pipeline requests. Further action should be taken **by actors in the field** to identify advanced delivery points, reachable by trucks/pick-up, where people can come to take their items/cash/vouchers after having been informed of the day of distribution for their respective zone (as has been done in many countries).



## *Rec N°5: Improve the shelter situation*

**Agencies active in the provision of shelter** should ensure that tarpaulins are rapidly distributed in high altitude remote areas where there is currently little or no coverage. In other areas, they should implement the transition to more permanent shelters through the distribution of CGI and shelter kits and, when the situation becomes conducive, implement the transition to cash-based shelter solutions.

## *Rec N°6: Step up coordinated inter-sectoral and integrated responses, especially for areas that have not yet received assistance*

Instead of continuing 'silo-ed' responses, **all aid actors active in a given location** should strive to deliver (different) goods and services in a coordinated manner to ensure the delivery of integrated responses. Such responses will particularly be made possible when **inter-sector coordination** underpins the various sectors, instead of being guided by the sectors. Such inter-sector coordination should be area-focused, and meetings should happen as close as possible to affected areas, in particular at the municipal level as a support to the mayors and their staff.

## *Rec N°7: Facilitate a gradual transition to cash-based solutions*

Through engagement with **telecom companies, microfinance institutions and rural credit and saving mechanisms**, **aid actors** should facilitate the transition to cash-based systems. This will require proper market studies, analysis of indebtedness mechanisms, and recapitalisation processes. It will also require security assessments to not put people in danger when receiving cash, and above all, a creative approach to build on previous experiences of cash in Haiti. The **capacity of OCHA** to continue to support this transition to cash should be strengthened.

## *Rec N°8: Further improve communications with affected populations to ensure better acceptance and improve security*

Following the development of a coordinated strategy for communicating with communities (CWC) and several important steps in this direction, **all aid organisations** who have not yet started to put this into practice should do so.

## *Rec N°9: Increase access of national and local NGOs to financial resources and capacity strengthening support*

As it is more and more the case in the field of development, in areas where INGOs are confronted with difficulties **donors** should encourage the use of more agile national and local NGOs, with more resources being channelled through these local civil society actors. In areas where partnership and subcontracting are common practice, these local NGOs would be well-served if agencies contracting them include capacity strengthening support in their agreements.

## 4.2. Key recommendations for the longer term in Haiti

### *Rec N°10: Ensure that the adoption of a national disaster law is a key priority of the Government*

In view of the lessons learnt from the hurricane Matthew response, the adoption of a national disaster law is a necessity. This law should include a framework that sets out roles and responsibilities of **the DPC, Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, and relevant line ministries** in the management of preparedness and disaster response. It should also strengthen the sustainability of the national system for disaster management and facilitate government action in respect of humanitarian principles. The law should include the provision to facilitate appropriate investment in recovery, preparedness and longer-term risk informed development which are key elements of effective preparedness.

### *Rec N°11: Improve the disaster information management system*

In order to avoid the recurrent problems regarding information management in future disaster management efforts, it is important to develop an information management system that is reliable, responsive and agile, in line with humanitarian principles, and supports government-led coordination. A database, including a geographic information system, should be set up **at the COUN** and be easily available on the internet, with procedures for COUD to insert on-line information gathered by COUC, municipal institutions and NGOs. This would contribute to OCHA's work on the production of 3W maps. Specialised institutions with a capacity in GIS and information management could be mobilised to help the DPC to be more able to carry out these tasks and be better equipped to assume its responsibilities.

### *Rec N°12: Make communication systems resilient*

Given that telecommunications are always critical to a response, it might be an option to equip the departmental and communal authorities with satellite phones or with less costly solar/battery-operated portable HF radios. This would go a long way to limit the duration of the period without communication between affected areas and the central level. **Aid agencies and other international actors should work with the authorities** in identifying appropriate equipment, distributing it to strategic locations (mayors, DPC offices at the department and commune levels), undertaking proper staff training, and, as a characteristic of resilience, ensuring that these systems can continue to function when other means of communications no longer operate.

### *Rec N°13: Develop pre-disaster arrangements with the private sector to ensure that sufficient equipment for road clearing is in place at the commune and department levels*

**Aid agencies** should promote pre-disaster arrangements with the government that ensure that both small and heavy equipment is on standby in the case of an imminent natural disaster. Specific standby arrangements could be established with private public work companies. In addition, **donors and agencies** should agree on standby arrangements with private actors, which are less costly than deploying MCDA assets.

### 4.3. Key recommendations for the humanitarian sector

#### *Rec N°14: Strengthen the capacity of OCHA in fragile states and at risk countries*

**Donors and OCHA** should continue to engage in a much more strategic dialogue with OCHA management about strengthening the capacity of OCHA, especially at a time when global humanitarian needs are increasing. This dialogue and support are needed even more in fragile states or in situations where signals indicate that a crisis could be unfolding. Using UNDAC teams as a mechanism to fix OCHA problems should only be a last resort.

#### *Rec N°15: Establish proper dialogue with regard to assessing the gravity of a situation and agency mobilisation*

When a disaster is imminent, **agencies** should share their assessments and internal plans for scaling up. This would help to understand the level of engagement to be expected from each agency.

#### *Rec N°16: Strategically use opportunities offered by remote sensing and crowdsourcing technologies*

In view of the lack of information about certain areas, satellites images, drone recording and crowdsourcing should be mobilised at the onset of the emergency.

#### *Rec N°17: In contexts where clusters are not activated, UN and international agencies (who are the designated cluster-leads) must realise that they have a responsibility in coordination, in particular in actively supporting governmental coordination capacities*

Looking at this discrepancy in terms of how agencies understood their co-lead role, **HCT, under the leadership of the HC/RC** should analyse, in a given context and as part of a system-wide preparedness effort, what are the key issues to take on board when approaching coordination with national institutions in the context of the 'localisation agenda'. A decision not to activate the clusters should encompass the responsibility to promote and support certain coordination activities.

#### *Rec N°18: Identify a way or mechanism that can make humanitarian and development funding instruments better articulated and able to address key humanitarian and recovery needs more quickly*

There are different issues to consider in this area.

**Assessments to facilitate the transition:** In many contexts there is a plethora of multilateral assessment, planning, and funding instruments (e.g. HNO/HRP, Flash Appeal, PDNA, UNDAF, etc.) combined with donors' and agencies plans and strategies, (e.g the EU's plans and strategies, the World Bank's DaLA, etc.), thus contributing to a high level of confusion.



**Articulating visions:** Making these instruments better articulated will address humanitarian and recovery needs more strategically, better connecting the needs and capacities under different timeframes, operational modalities (through government, through the private sector, aid actors or civil society), and for different sectors. This calls for much better dialogue between the humanitarian, recovery, and development communities, with better and more fluid exchanges on contexts, risks, needs, and capacities.

**Coordinating action:** While LRRD coordination in post-conflict situations remains much more problematic (contradictions between respecting IHL and humanitarian principles –GHDI– and OECD Paris Principles, and the need to relate to existing policies for operations in fragile states), it can be much more straightforward in post disaster contexts, where the coordination role should largely be in the hands of the affected countries. But inter-institution competition rapidly becomes a hindrance.

#### 4.4. *Key recommendations in the context of the Grand Bargain*

Following the RTE's conclusions using the Grand Bargain framework, the following recommendations put some of the Grand Bargain commitments in perspective.

##### *Rec N°19: Continue to use the Grand Bargain as a two-way dialogue*

While donors expect humanitarian organisations to live up to their Grand Bargain commitments in terms of, for example, developing joint needs assessments, involving local and national responders, or improving communications with affected populations, operational agencies, understandably, pointed to the need for donors to recognise and operationalise their commitments. Close scrutiny of collective performance both at the system-wide level and at the agency level in order to improve the response, and making sufficient financial resources available go hand in hand.

##### *Rec N°20: Insert a level of realism and honesty in working together*

Inevitably, collective agreements such as the Grand Bargain include a certain level of both aspirational and ambiguous commitments. For example, the commitment for a single overall needs assessment appears to be more driven by the interests of donors than by a sense of what is feasible on the ground or even desirable in view of the principle of independence. As the response to Haiti shows, and as emphasised by many participants at the WHS, the humanitarian system is, in fact, a highly competitive eco-system, in which agencies compete (for funding) and donors pick and choose their priorities. Taking this reality into account points to the limits of collective humanitarian action, while recognising that everyone involved would benefit from more honesty in noting their respective challenges.

The table on the next page provides a summary of the findings and the related recommendations of this RTE.

## 4.5. Summary of findings and related recommendations


Finding	Related recommendations	Grand Bargain Commitment
1. Return on investments in disaster preparedness	<p>1. Develop a consolidated overview of areas not yet reached by aid</p> <p>10. Ensure that the adoption of a disaster law is a key priority of the Government</p>	
2. Rapid mobilisation of international actors	<p>15. Establish proper dialogue with regard to assessing the gravity of a situation and agency mobilisation</p>	
3. Fragile telecommunications systems	<p>12. Make communication systems resilient</p> <p>16. Strategically use opportunities offered by remote sensing and crowdsourcing technologies</p>	
4. Erratic data management and competing needs assessments	<p>11. Improve the disaster information management system</p>	<p>5. Improve joint and impartial needs assessments</p>
5. Logistical challenges leading to an uneven response	<p>4. Continue efforts to overcome the bottlenecks in the delivery of aid</p> <p>13. Develop pre-disaster arrangements with the private sector to ensure that sufficient equipment for road clearing is in place at the commune and department levels</p>	<p>4. Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews</p>
6. Mixed results for the technical and sectoral areas	<p>2. Accelerate the process of supporting the recovery in terms of food security</p> <p>3. Ensure that displacement to evacuation centres does not become prolonged and accelerate the delivery of proper assistance and protection for those who return</p> <p>5. Improve the shelter situation</p> <p>7. Facilitate gradual transition to cash-based solutions</p>	<p>2. Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming</p>
7. Donor fatigue and depleted financial resources	<p>9. Increase access of national and local NGOs to financial resources and capacity strengthening support</p> <p>18. Identify a way or mechanism that can make humanitarian and development funding instruments better articulated and able to address key humanitarian and recovery needs more quickly</p>	<p>1. Greater transparency</p> <p>2. More support and funding tools for national and local responders</p>

		<p>7. Increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding</p> <p>8. Reduce the earmarking of donor contributions</p> <p>9. Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements</p>	<p>7. Increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding</p> <p>8. Reduce the earmarking of donor contributions</p> <p>9. Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements</p>
8. Patchy coordination	<p>6. Step up coordinated inter-sectoral and integrated responses</p> <p>14. Strengthen the capacity of OCHA in fragile states and at-risk countries</p> <p>17. In contexts where clusters are not activated, UN and international agencies (who are the designated cluster-leads) must realise that they have a responsibility with regard to coordination, in particular in actively supporting governmental coordination capacities</p> <p>19. Continue to use the Grand Bargain as a two-way dialogue</p> <p>20. Insert a level of realism and honesty in working together</p>	<p>10. Enhancing engagement between humanitarian and development actors</p>	<p>10. Enhancing engagement between humanitarian and development actors</p>
9. Accountability to affected populations depends on the agencies	<p>8. Further improve communications with affected populations</p>	<p>5. A participation revolution: include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives</p>	<p>5. A participation revolution: include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives</p>





# ANNEXES







Charcoal production



# Annex N°1: Terms of Reference of the Matthew RTE

## Independent Real Time Evaluation – Terms of Reference – Evaluators Hurricane Matthew International Response, Haiti, November 2016

We are looking for a team of two highly motivated, self-starting individuals, of whom at least one knows Haiti and one speaks French, to undertake a Real Time Evaluation of the international response.

The post is for 3–4 weeks and will include:

- 3–5 days reading and trip organisation
- 10–14 days' field trip (Port au Prince plus 2 field locations)
- 6–7 days report writing
- 2 days feedback to the Steering Committee and report amendments where appropriate

The candidates must be prepared to take up the post in early November with 30 days foreseen in total.

This RTE has been commissioned jointly by donors to the response who have agreed, together with a representative number of agencies, to set up a Steering Committee to oversee its implementation and follow-up of findings.

### Background

Hurricane Matthew struck on the 3rd October as a category 4 hurricane. The south-west peninsula has been particularly affected. Four departments have experienced heavy rains and strong winds affecting shelter and livelihoods in a situation where cholera is now endemic and food insecurity is high. Elections are also on the horizon.

The international community response began through the mobilisation of preparedness mechanisms bolstered by additional programme funding. A Flash Appeal was launched requesting over \$119m over 3 months and a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, led by the World Bank, European Union and UNDP is due to begin.

This is the first major rapid onset response post commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit and Grand Bargain. It presents a unique opportunity to look at:

1. Whether the international response, as guided by the Flash Appeal and supported by international humanitarian agencies, is proving effective, efficient, relevant and timely. Issues of international leadership in support of the Government, coordination and accountability to affected populations will be considered as enabling factors in delivering these.
2. How in planning and delivery reflect the commitments in the Grand Bargain to improve the effectiveness and quality of the response provided to affected populations in Haiti.

The evaluation will be undertaken by independent evaluators and will represent their views and not the views of any one agency or person.

Findings will also be used to inform this and future disaster management responses including through real-time feedback and learning to the HCT. This will enable the adoption of corrective actions as needed.

## Purpose

The real time evaluation (RTE) aims to hold the international system to account for their response to Hurricane Matthew in Haiti. It will be an independent evaluation to assess elements of the International Community's response operation and thereby inform ongoing support, future programmatic direction and focus.

## Objectives of the RTE

1. **Challenges** To understand the critical challenges faced during the initial response phase and the extent to which these were effectively managed. In particular to give consideration to:
  - access and security including the role of MINUSTAH;
  - preparedness including prepositioning of stocks;
  - coordination between GoH and international humanitarian response structures;
  - pre-existing needs and gaps in response (cholera, food security), and implications for an emergency response?
2. **System Effectiveness** To review the response against the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, coordination, and make recommendations on those areas requiring improvement. In particular, to focus on:
  - Leadership arrangements and support
  - Coordination structures and systems
  - Appropriateness and effectiveness of preparedness
  - Coherence/ joined up system effectiveness including strategic approach, agency mandates and focus, e.g.: whole of protection caseload approach, linkages between an emergency cholera response and protracted cholera crisis response, humanitarian–development nexus
  - CivMil engagement and coordination
  - Role of civil protection teams
3. **Grand Bargain** To identify specific commitments in the Grand Bargain that have and have not been well integrated in the appeal and the initial stages of the response, and make recommendations as to how these should be handled going forward. In particular to focus on:
  - Needs assessments and sectorial priorities
  - cash commitments and scale up,
  - participation/ accountability to affected populations,
  - localization and enhanced cross agency collaboration
  - Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements.
4. **Common Issues and Lessons Emerging; Recommendations**

## Detail

Under the management of the Haiti Independent RTE Steering Committee, the key roles and responsibilities of the Consultants include but are not limited to, the following;

- Review existing documents on the international response to Hurricane Matthew in Haiti
- Meetings with key partners in PauP, Les Cayes and Jeremie (it is expected that the consultants split for field visits)
- Regular updates and feedback to the Consultant supporting the Mission and reporting back to the Steering Committee

- Debriefing with the Steering Committee
- Production of a final report for dissemination

The Consultants will also:

- Comply with all host nation rules and regulations.
- Efficiently manage and maintain all equipment issued.
- Remain flexible and prepared to carry out additional duties as required.

## **Methodology**

The consultants will develop an analytical framework for the evaluation including a mix of qualitative and quantitative tools to underpin it.

The evaluation will be built around semi-directive interviews and review of documentation from both agencies responding to the crisis, the Government and affected populations.

All documents and data collected for the purpose of this RTE will be treated as confidential.

Conclusions and recommendations will be no longer than 20 pages plus annexes.

## **Timeframe**

The post holders are expected to deploy to Haiti in mid-November for 2 weeks, with a debrief to Steering Committee members at the end of that period and a final report one week afterwards – also to be shared with the Steering Committee.

## **Outputs**

- Analytical framework and tools for RTE
- Presentation of findings to the Steering Committee: both good practices and areas for improvement, as well as recommendations (generic recommendations applicable to future situations in Haiti & elsewhere; recommendations specific for the future of this response).
- Final report

## **Management Arrangements**

The Consultants will be line managed by the Haitian RTE Steering Committee. The lead consultant will work independently of DFID but liaise with the Mission Enabler to ensure that organisation of the RTE is coherent and feasible.

The Mission Enabler will act as the primary link between Garda World, partners and the consultants to ensure an appropriate and secure operational platform.

## **Security**

- The Consultants will comply with all security measures put in place by post and also comply with the CHASE OT Safety and Security Plan.
- The Consultants will request permission from the DFID Haiti Representative for all movement outside the location of posting and agree the security plan before such movements take place.
- The Consultants will carry appropriate communications means at all times.



## Annex N°2: Itinerary and schedule of the RTE

Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
Fri 11 Nov	London	09:00-17:39	Briefings - DFID	CHASE OT	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grunewald
Mon 14 Nov	Port au Prince	09:00	Briefing	Francois Deruisseaux, DFID	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grunewald
		10:00-12:00	Meeting with RTE Steering Committee	Steering Committee	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grunewald
		15:00 – 16:00	DPC COUN	Mme Jean-Baptiste	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grunewald
		17:00	Interviews	Ben Noble, Country Director	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grunewald
Tues 15 Nov	Jeremie	11:30-12:00	Delegate	Delegate	F. Grunewald
		12:00-13:00	OCHA	Michel Boulay, Head of Field Coordination	F. Grunewald
		14:00-14:00	Meeting with DPC	DPC Coordinator	F. Grunewald
		14:00-15:30	Meeting with Mayor and visit of UNDP project activities, including briefing on risk mapping and implications for early recovery	Barbara Calixte	F. Grunewald
		15:30-17:00	Visit to FAD project activities	Balmir Gabriel	F. Grunewald
	Les Cayes	10:00-11:00	OCHA office	Sarah Elliot, Head of Field Office	E. Schenkenberg
		11:00-12:00	Meeting with DPC	DPC	E. Schenkenberg
		13:00-15:00	Meeting with ACTED	Marine Fournier, PM Wash Choléra, acting Area Coordinator Emmanuel Bolane, Les Cayes Base Manager	E. Schenkenberg

Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
		16:30-17:30	Meeting with IMC	Sean Casey, Emergency Response Team Leader	E. Schenkenberg
Wed 16 Nov	Jeremie and Moron	08:30-12:00	Visit of CARE project activities	Magali Benjamin, Team Leader	F. Grünewald
	Anse D'Hainault	13:30-15:30	Visit of IFRC project activities	Yvette MVE, IFRC Focal Point	F. Grünewald
	Jeremie	19:00-20:00	Meeting with IFRC at Place Charmont	Georg Ecker, FACT WASH & Hub Coordinator Jérémie / Grand'Anse	F. Grünewald
	Les Cayes/Camp Perin	08:30-12:00	Briefing with Head of Sub-Office followed by visit to WFP distribution carried out by Samaritan's Purse	Adrian Störbeck, Head of Sub-Office	E. Schenkenberg
		13:30-14:30	CRS	Beth Carroll, Country Director	
		16:30-17:30	Meeting with UNICEF Area Coordinator	Akhil Iyer	
Thurs 17 Nov	Bonbon	09:00-11:00	Meeting with Mayor and visit of Samaritan Purse project activities	Patrick	F. Grünewald
	Abricots	12:00-14:00	Visit of ACTED projects	Agathe Lo Presti, Area Coordinator Elise Hannaford, Emergency PM	F. Grünewald
	Les Cayes	10:00 – 11:30	AVSI	Marianna Cammerinesi	E. Schenkenberg
	Haitian Red Cross Office, Les Cayes	15:00-17:00	Haitian Red Cross and partner national societies (American Red Cross, Dominican Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Spanish Red Cross, French Red Cross)	Marie David, American Red Cross	E. Schenkenberg
Fri 18 Nov	Beaumont	09:30-11:30	Meet with Mayor and visit of Oxfam projects	Pierre Jacques Vil Field Manager Response Post-Matthew	F. Grünewald

Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
		12:00-14:30	Visit of Action Aid and Kowòdinasyon paysan Grandans (KPGA) projects	Catherine Rodgers Communication officer	F. Grünewald
		14:30-15:30	Visit of Mouvman Fanm Aktif d'Ayiti/MOFKA		F. Grünewald
	Camp Perin	08:00-11:30	Visit Oxfam of project activities	Pierre Jacques Vil Field Manager Response Post-Matthew	E. Schenkenberg
		11:00-12:00	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	Sabine Rosenthaler, programme officer (Sud)	
Mon 21 Nov	Port au Prince	08:30-09:30	DFID	Francois Desrusseaux, Country Representative, DFID	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		10:30-11:30	CLIO Christian Aid	Prosperity Raymond	F. Grünewald
		10:30-11:30	Switzerland - Swiss Cooperation	Jean Francois Golay Humanitarian Aid Programme Coordinator, Corina Eggenberger, SDC	E. Schenkenberg
		12:00-13:00	ECHO	Jordi Toress Miralles Head of Office	F. Grünewald
		14:00-15:00	IFRC	Florent Del Pinto Head of Emergency Operations (HeOps)	E. Schenkenberg
		14:00-15:00	Oxfam	Damien Berrendorf	F. Grünewald



Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
		16:00-17:00	ACTED	Emilie BERNARD Directrice Pays Haïti	F. Grünewald
		16:00-17:00	CARE	Jean-Michel Vigreux, Country Director	E. Schenkenberg
Tues 22 Nov	Port au Prince	9:30-10:30	UN DSRSG/Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator	Mourad Wahiba	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		11:00-12:00	MINUSTAH Logbase	Luc Duchesne, Chef de Cabinet Thierry Quiquempoix Senior Joint Operations Officer MINUSTAH Chief Joint Operations Centre	E. Schenkenberg
		11:30-12:30	WHO	Jean-Luc Poncelet, Country Representative	F. Grünewald
		13:00 – 14:00	UNDP	Yvonne Helle, Senior Country Director	E. Schenkenberg
		13:00-14:00	UNICEF	Marc Vincent, Country Representative and senior managers	F. Grünewald
		15:00-16:00	FAO	Nathanael Hishamunda Patrick Jackson	F. Grünewald
		17:00 – 18:00	OCHA	Alexandra Sicotte Levesque, Global Adviser, Community Engagement	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
Wed 23 Nov	Port au Prince	08:00-09:00	OFDA US Embassy	Jonathon Anderson, Haïti DART Team Leader, Haïti, Elizabeth Bellardo Deputy for Coordination, DART Team Haïti	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald

Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
		11:30-12:30	WFP	Wendy Bigham, Deputy Country Director, Haiti and WFP senior managers	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		14:00-15:00	MSF Belgium	Sebastien Libert, Chef de Mission Haiti – MSF OCB	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		15:00-16:00	World Vision	John Hasse, Country Director	F. Grünewald
		15:30-16:30	Concern and Welthungerhilfe	Nellie Kingston, Country Director Mahamadou Issoufou-Wasmeler	E. Schenkenberg
		17:00 -18:00		Sophie Tholstrup (Cash) Coordination	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
Thurs 24 Nov	Port au Prince	10:00-11:00	Canada	Marie-Eve Castonguay	F. Grünewald
		11:00-12:00	IOM	Gregoire GOODSTEIN Chef de Mission, Fabien Sambussy, Head of Operations	E. Schenkenberg
		16:00-17:00	DPC COUN	Madame Jean-Baptiste Directrice DPC	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		18:00- 19:00	OCHA	Enzo di Taranto, Head of Office	E. Schenkenberg
Fri 25 Nov	Port au Prince	09:00-10:00	French Embassy	Madame L'Ambassadrice	F. Grünewald
		15:00-17:00	Debriefing	Steering Committee	
Sat 26 Nov		10:00 – 12:00	Meeting with extended Humanitarian Country Team – presentation of initial findings	OCHA and HCR members and partners	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald
		14:00 – 18:00	Preparation of key findings		
Sun 27 Nov		Full day	Preparation of key findings		

Date	Location	Time	Agency/GoH counterpart - Activity	Interviewee/Contact	Consultant
Mon 28 Nov/ Tues 29 Nov	Travel				
Wed 30 Nov	London	10:00-12:00	Debriefing DFID	CHASE OT	E. Schenkenberg & F. Grünewald



## Annex N°3: Consulted documents

- ACAPS (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Department Profile: Nippes*, 21 October 2016, Genève, ACAPS, 7 p.
- ACAPS (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Department Profile, Sud*, 21 October 2016, Genève, ACAPS, 7 p.
- ACAPS (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Department Profile, Grand' Anse*, 21 October 2016, Genève, ACAPS, 7 p.
- ACAPS (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Briefing Note 5, 5 – 14 October 2016*, Genève, ACAPS, 9 p.
- ACAPS (2016), *Haiti: Lessons learned for Hurricane Matthew response*, Genève, ACAPS, 10 October 2016, 6 p.
- CECCHINE, Gary & al. (2013), *The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, Considerations for Army Leaders*, Washington D.C., RAND Corporation, 115 p.
- COORDINATION NATIONALE DE LA SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE (2016), *Bulletin de situation #1 – Sécurité alimentaire – Ouragan Mathieu – 28/10/2016*, Port-au-Prince : République d'Haïti, 4 p.
- DEPARTEMENT REPONSES URGENCES (2016), *Rapport de situation du secteur WASH en Haïti N° 1*, 29 octobre 2016, Port-au-Prince : République d'Haïti, 6 p.
- FOUNTAIN SMITH, S. & al. (2016), *Joint Donor letter Haiti*, 2 p.
- GUHA-SAPIR, Debarati & al. (2011), *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Final Report*, Washington D.C., USAID, 130 p.
- IASC (2016), *IASC Emergency Directors Group – EDG Teleconference on Haiti: Summary Note*, 24 October 2016, New York, United Nations, 3 p.
- IASC (2016), *IASC Emergency Directors Group –Teleconference on Haiti: Proposed Agenda*, 24 October 2016, New York, United Nations, 1 p.
- MINUSTAH JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE (2016), *Organization of Convoys in Post-Matthew Humanitarian Recovery*, 12 October 2016, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 3 p.
- O'BRIEN, Stephen (2016), *Response Stephen O'Brien to donor letter Haiti*, New York, UN, 3 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Flash Appeal Haiti*, New York, United Nations, 10 October 2016, 28 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Hurricane Matthew, Priorities and Achievements, Critical Needs Overview*, 5 November 2016, United Nations, 30 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Situation Report N° 19 (02 November 2016)*, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 6 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Situation Report N° 18 (31 October 2016)*, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 6 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Haiti: Hurricane Matthew, Situation Report N° 17 (28 October 2016)*, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 6 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Haiti : Hurricane Matthew*, 21 octobre 2016, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 2 p.
- OCHA (2016), *Haïti : Aperçu de Qui fait Quoi et Où (3W)*, 20 octobre 2016, Port-au-Prince, United Nations, 3 p.

PAHO/WHO (2016), *Hurricane Matthew: Situation Report N° 23*, 28 October 2016, Washington D.C., Pan American Health Organization, 6 p.

STODDARD, Abby (2002), *The US and the “bilateralisation of humanitarian response”, Background research for HPG Report 12*, London, ODI, 9 p.

UNDAC (2016), *End of Mission Report, Hurricane Matthew – Haiti, 2 – 25 October 2016*, OCHA, United Nations, 16 p.

UNICEF (2016), *Haiti Situation Report*, 01 novembre 2016, Port-au-Prince, United Nation, 6 p.

UNITED NATIONS (2016), *New UN system approach on cholera in Haiti*, New York, United Nations, 1 p.

UNITED NATIONS (2016), *Emergency Directors’ Mission to Haiti, DRAFT Terms of Reference*, New York, United Nations, 2 p.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (2010), *Review of the Department of State Interagency Coordination and Public Communication Regarding U.S. Citizen Victims in the Earthquake-Destroyed Hotel Montana in Haiti, Report Number ISP-I-10-72*, July 2010, Washington D.C., Government of United States, 34 p.

USAID (2011), *Latin America and the Caribbean: Disaster Risk Reduction – Program Overview – 2011*, Washington D.C., USAID, 9 p.

USAID, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (2016), *Relying on markets for shelter response in Haiti: An analysis of the CGI market in hurricane-affected areas*, Washington D.C. : USAID, Catholic Relief Services, 2 p.

USAID, OFDA (2016), *Haiti Program Summary*, 30 September 2016, Washington D.C. : USAID, OFDA, 4 p.

USAID, OFDA (2016), *Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Sector Update*, Washington D.C.: USAID, OFDA, 2 p.

WEINBERGER, Stuart N. (2010), *Who Should Set Airlift Priorities During Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations and on What Basis?*, Newport, Joint Military Operations Department, 28 p.

